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Should Securities Industry Self-
Regulatory Organizations Be Considered
Government Agencies?
Roberta S. Karmel*
Introduction
Securities industry self-regulatory organizations ("SROs") began as private
sector membership organizations of securities industry professionals. They set
standards of conduct for their members and disciplined errant members. Securities
industry SROs existed before the federal securities laws were enacted in 1933 and
1934, and important concepts of federal law were taken from SRO regulation and
became an added layer of regulation on top of SRO regulation.' Over the last
seventy-five years, SROs have grown in membership and become more powerful
organizations, but they also have become integrated into the scheme of federal
statutory regulation, and now operate subject to Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") oversight of all of their activities. Moreover, as SROs have
proliferated, some new SROs have been created by amendments to the securities
laws. They are thus a peculiar mix of private sector self-regulation and delegated
governmental regulation.
This article addresses the questions of whether, and to what extent,
securities industry SROs have become government agencies, and whether, and to
what extent, they should be subject to constitutional and statutory controls on
government agencies, focusing principally on the Financial Industry Regulatory
* Roberta S. Karmel is Centennial Professor of Law at Brooklyn Law School and Co-
Director of the Center for the Study of International Business Law at Brooklyn Law School.
She is a former Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Comnission, a former director
of the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. and a former member of the National Adjudicatory
Council of the NASD. A summer research stipend from Dean Joan Wexler, Brooklyn Law
School, is gratefully acknowledged. The research assistance of Leigh Duffy, Brooklyn Law
School student, is also appreciated and acknowledged. Thanks also are due to my colleagues
Jason Mazzone and Nelson Tebbe for their helpful comments.
1 See Special Study on Market Structure, Listing Standards and Corporate Governance, 57
Bus. LAW. 1487,1489-1510 (2002).
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Agency ("FINRA"), a new entity which combined the National Association of
Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") and the member regulatory functions of NYSE
Group, Inc. ("NYSE"). 2 The cases addressing these issues are contradictory, and
generally not based on any overriding constitutional law principles. In some areas,
the courts have just stated that an SRO is exercising delegated governmental power.
In other areas, the courts have stated that an SRO is a private membership
organization. Sometimes, courts have distinguished between the commercial and
regulatory functions of SROs, in order to draw lines separating the laws applicable to
government agencies from those applicable to private sector organizations.
However, it should be noted at the outset that FINRA, unlike a stock exchange, has
no commercial activities. The author's conclusion is that categorizing FINRA as a
government agency, at this time, would not necessarily be useful, since FINRA is
able to operate with more flexibility than a government agency, but when FINRA is
exercising investigative and disciplinary functions it should be treated like a
government agency. Furthermore, to the extent practicable FINRA should operate
according to transparency standards applicable to government agencies.
The stated purpose for the consolidation of the NASD and NYSE's
regulatory arm is to bring more efficiency to securities industry regulatory efforts by
creating a single rule book for broker-dealers. FINRA was designed as a monopoly
SRO under the active and direct oversight of the SEC.3 Although both the NASD and
the NYSE have long histories as SROs, subject to increasingly pervasive and
statutorily based SEC regulation, the creation of FINRA poses a question long
lurking in the structure and operation of the NASD: was the NASD for all practical
purposes a government agency, and if so, what are the constitutional and
administrative law ramifications of such a conclusion for its new incarnation,
FINRA?
2 See Susanne Craig, Deals and Dealmakers: For the NASD, Goodbye SIRA - Kay-Syrah
Sira-- Street's Securities Cop Renames Itself After Flap; A Muslim Connection, WALL ST. J., July 13,
2007, at C2. PressRelease, FINRA, NASD and NYSE Member Regulation Combine to Form the
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority-FINRA; FINRA Commences Operations as the Securities
Industry's Largest Non-Governmental Regulatory Organization, available at
http://www.finra.org/PressRoom/newsReleases/2007NewsReleases/PO36329.
3 The SEC approved a rule to amend the NASD By-Laws to accomplish this merger in
Order Approving Proposed Rule Change to Amend the By-Laws of NASD to Implement
Governance and Related Changes to Accommodate the Consolidation of the Member Firm
Regulatory Functions of NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 56145
(July 26, 2007) [hereinafter SEC FINRA Approval].
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Both the NASD and the NYSE began as voluntary organizations of broker-
dealers. Thereafter, the SEC obtained statutory authority to oversee their activities
pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 4 From the
enactment of that statute until the present, Congress and the SEC have struggled to
convert SROs from "private clubs" to public bodies, frequently exploiting scandals
to impose governance reforms on exchanges and the NASD.5 In 1983, every broker-
dealer registered with the SEC became required by statute to become a member of
the NASD. 6
Exchanges and the NASD long served two functions. They were
marketplaces for the trading of securities and regulators of their markets and their
members. As marketplaces, they engaged in fixing commissions and spreads until
these anti-competitive practices were banned by the SEC.7 These anti-competitive,
but long permitted activities, gave SRO members the incentive to remain members of
exchanges and the NASD and to uphold just and equitable principles of trade. As
regulators, they adopted rules, which can have the force of federal law,8 and
disciplined member firms and their associated members. These rules covered the
handling of transactions in the markets, requirements relating to the internal
operations of member firms and rules of fair practice for dealing with customers.9 In
addition, they operated arbitration facilities for disputes between member firms and
their employees and between member firms and their customers.10
Recently, the NYSE and the NASD separated their market and regulatory
functions into separate entities. Now that the broker-dealer regulatory functions of
the NYSE and NASD have merged, the monopoly status of FINRA strengthens its
4 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000).
5 See also Norman S. Poser, The Stock Exchanges of the United States and Europe:
Automation, Globalization, and Consolidation, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 497, 516 (2001). See
generally Roberta S. Karmel, Turning Seats Into Shares: Causes and Implications of Demutualization
of Stock and Futures Exchanges, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 367, 403-09 (2002).
6 Exchange Act § 15(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (Supp. II 2002). There is an exemption
for broker-dealers doing business exclusively on a stock exchange. See Pub. L. No. 98-38, §
3(a), 97 Stat. 206 (1983). With the merger of the NASD and NYSE Regulation, Inc., this
exemption will no longer be relevant as such broker-dealers were NYSE members.
7 See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007). See also Poser, supra
note 6, at 510-11.
8 Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2005).
9 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION (5th ed. 2005), at §§
14.1[3].
10 See id. at § 15.
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role as a regulator of broker-dealers. In connection with these developments, the SEC
exercised greater plenary power over the governance structure of the SROs. Over the
years, the NYSE and the NASD have been treated as private sector business
organizations for certain purposes, and as government or quasi-government entities
for other purposes. Is FINRA, now organized and recognized, and functioning only
as a regulator under the aegis of the SEC, a government regulator? And if so, what
are the implications of such a determination? These questions need to be examined
in the context of similar questions being raised with regard to a new securities
industry regulator, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board ("PCAOB"),
which was structured, in theory, as neither an SRO nor a government agency, and
which has been challenged as an unconstitutional organization.1
Regardless of whether the PCAOB should properly be categorized as a
government regulator, a self-regulator, or neither, it is unlikely that the courts will
decide that the NASD, which operated for almost seventy years as an SRO, has
somehow become an unconstitutional government agency now that it has become
FINRA. Nevertheless, its increasing government-like functions and operations raise
the question of what checks and balances and due process procedures are necessary
for such an SRO to have constitutional law accountability and administrative law
legitimacy. This article will address several important aspects of FINRA's functions
and legal status which raise the following issues: first, FINRA's immunity from suit;
second, the right of persons under FINRA investigation to claim their privilege
against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment; third, the role of FINRA as
manager of broker-dealer arbitration facilities; fourth, the due process rights of
persons prosecuted by FINRA; and fifth, FINRA's role with respect to anti-trust and
preemption issues.
Part II of this article will set forth the constitutional issues inherent in
FINRA's status as an SRO in the context of its history under the Exchange Act, which
has been repeatedly amended to grant the SEC more control of SROs. This analysis is
11 See Free Ent. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS
18029 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22, 2008). The district court assumed the PCAOB was a government
regulator and addressed Appointments Clause issues, as did the circuit court. In 1975,
Congress created the Securities Investment Protection Corporation ("SIPC"), as a broker-
dealer membership corporation, and specified that it shall not be "an agency or establishment
of the United States Government." Pub. L. 91-958, 84 Stat. 1636, § 3 (1975), 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc
(2000). The PCAOB regulates accountants who file documents with the SEC. SIPC is an insurer
of funds and securities in broker-dealer customer accounts.
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related to the Appointments Clause issues which have been raised with respect to
the governance of the PCAOB, but unlike the PCAOB, FINRA's directors are not
directly appointed by the SEC. Part III will discuss cases addressing the NASD's or
NYSE's immunity from suit for their regulatory decisions and functions, the right of
persons under NASD investigation to claim deprivation of their Fifth Amendment
rights, and the status of NASD arbitration facilities. Part IV will discuss the
constitutional and administrative due process rights of persons subject to FINRA
investigations and enforcement actions and FINRA rule-making, and inquire
whether further rights should be accorded to persons who are SRO members. Part V
will discuss the status of SRO rules in cases posing preemption and antitrust issues.
The article will conclude that as long as the securities industry, rather than the SEC,
controls the governance of FINRA and the selection of its Board of Governors,
FINRA will not be a government entity, but since FINRA will be exercising
delegated governmental functions with regard to discipline and rule-making,
fundamental constitutional and administrative law protections should be afforded to
persons affected by these activities.
Each of these issues could probably generate an article on its own, so to
some extent this article will be speculative and hopefully will spark further work by
the author and by others. These are difficult and important issues that go to the heart
of the legitimacy of the administrative state in which we live and work, at a time
when governmental functions are being continually privatized or outsourced. Such
outsourcing raises constitutional accountability issues, which in the case of FINRA
become a question of whether FINRA should be accountable to its members, who are
forced to join by federal statute, or to the general public. Furthermore, if FINRA has
indeed become a public organization, what distinguishes it from a government
agency?
I. Factors for Determining Whether FINRA Should Be Considered a
Government Agency
A. The Constitutional Framework
In theory, the government cannot delegate its power to a private standard
setting body, but there have been no cases striking down legislation on non-
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
delegation grounds since the mid-1930s.12 Although some academics have argued for
a resuscitation of the non-delegation doctrine, 13 the Supreme Court has preferred to
invoke the separation of powers doctrine or other principles when non-delegation
has been invoked.14 Generally courts have upheld legislation delegating
governmental power to administrative agencies on the ground that an intelligible
principle is laid down in the statute for the agency to follow. 15
The problem of a delegation by an agency, which is itself exercising
delegated powers, to a private standard setting body like FINRA further confounds
the question of whether the private body either is exercising delegated governmental
power or is, indeed, a government entity. Yet, such privatization of governmental
functions has become increasingly common. 16 There are two basic analyses pursuant
to which FINRA might be considered to be either a government agency or a private
body exercising delegated governmental power. These are the public entity and the
state action doctrines.
Because the U.S. Constitution applies to the government, private entities
generally are not liable for infringing constitutional protections of individuals.
Nevertheless, private entities and individuals are required to comply with
constitutional imperatives if they are acting as the state. This is sometimes referred to
as the public entity doctrine, which emanates from Lebron v. National Railroad
Passenger Corp.'7 in which the Court ruled that Amtrak was a public entity or the
Government itself for constitutional purposes, even though Congress declared that it
12 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). See also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 484-91
(1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
13 See STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 67-68
(6th ed. 2006). Other scholars have argued to the contrary. Id.
14 See, e.g., Clinton, 524 U.S. 417 ; Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-80 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See also Steven G. Calabresi, The
Centrality of Clinton v. City of New York, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 77, 85-86 (2004). See also Free Ent.
Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18029 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 22,
2008) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting), at 53-54.
15 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928); Yakus v. United
States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944). See, e.g., Am. Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
16 See John J. Dilulio, Jr., Government by Proxy: A Faithful Overview, 116 HARV. L. REV.
1271 (2002); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (2000);
Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 CoLuM. L. REV. 1367 (2003); Steven J.
Schwarcz, Private Ordering, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 319 (2002).
17 513 U.S. 374 (1995).
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would not be an agency of the United States.18 In order to meet the tests for
categorizing a private corporation as a government entity after Lebron, courts have
required the following:
"[Only if (1) the government created the corporate entity by special
law, (2) the government created the entity to further governmental
objectives, and (3) the government retains permanent authority to
appoint a majority of the directors of the corporation will the
corporation be deemed a government entity for the purpose of the
state action requirement." 19
As will be demonstrated below, FINRA is not a governmental entity under
this formulation since it was not created by special law and the government will not
appoint a majority of its directors. Nevertheless, FINRA could not exist without SEC
approval, and the SEC has dictated the composition of its board of governors,
although not the persons who will serve on the board. This differentiates FINRA
from the PCAOB, which was created by a special statute and whose chairman and
directors are appointed by the SEC, and thus may well be a government entity under
the Lebron analysis. 20
Another level of analysis with respect to FINRA is whether, since it is
funded entirely by assessments on the securities industry, the government has
delegated taxing authority to a private body. At least one scholar has argued that the
taxing authority should not be delegated, as this is a prerogative of the Congress.
21
18 Id. at 391. Previously, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 543 (1987), the Court held that a committee was not a part of the
government required to comply with the Constitution, although it had been chartered by
Congress, was regulated by federal law, and was partially federally funded.
19 Horvath v. Westport Library Ass'n, 362 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2004), quoting Hack
v. President & Fellows of Yale Coll., 237 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 2000).
20 See Donna Nagy, Playing Peekaboo With Constitutional Law: The PCAOB and Its
Public/Private Status, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 975 (2005) [hereinafter Nagy]. That the PCAOB is
a government entity was essentially conceded in Free Ent. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24310 (Mar. 21, 2007), and this issue was not addressed
on appeal. SIPC has a board of directors of seven persons, one appointed by the Secretary of
the Treasury, one appointed by the Federal Reserve Board, and five by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate. 78 U.S.C. ccc (c) (2000). Yet, the statute creating SIPC
specifies that it is not a government agency. See Horvath, 362 F.3d 147.
21 See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Reconsidering the Nondelegation Doctrine: Universal
Service, the Power to Tax and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND. L. J. 239, 241 (2005). According to
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On the other hand, as will be explained below, FINRA did not originate as an agency
created by the government, but began as a private organization that was gradually
transformed into an agency which exercises governmental functions.
Under the state action doctrine, the courts examine whether the conduct or
activities of a private party can be attributed to the government for purposes of
constitutional law accountability. The cases in this area are, at best, fact-specific and
doctrinally murky, but they traditionally required one of three circumstances: (1) the
exercise of coercive power or significant encouragement by the government of the
activity in question; (2) performance of a traditional governmental function by a
private entity; or (3) a "symbiotic" interdependence between the government and the
private entity.22 One test of whether a private organization is a state actor is whether
it is exercising powers traditionally and exclusively reserved to government.
Therefore, a private utility company was held not to be a state actor when it cut off
service without notice and a hearing. 23 However, running a (company) town was
held to be state action, 24 as was holding an election for government office. 25 Running
and regulating schools has been held not to be an essential state function,26 but in an
important recent case, Brentwood Academy v. Tennessee Secondary School Athletic
Association,27 the Court found a private entity regulating high school athletics was a
state actor because of government "entwinement." After Brentwood, some courts
have focused on whether "the state has so far insinuated itself into a position of
interdependence with the private entity that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity." 28 Another test used in the state action cases
applies where the government affirmatively authorizes, encourages, or facilitates
FINRA's CEO, FINRA's $550 million budget is paid by the securities industry. An Interview
with FINRA CEO Mary Shapiro, EQUITIES, Sept. 2007, at 61.
22 See Nagy, supra, note 21; In the Matter of the Application of Justin F. Ficken,
Exchange Act Release No. 54,699 (Nov. 3, 2006), at 7-9.
23 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974).
24 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
25 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944).
26 In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830 (1982) and Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v.
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), the Court found actions by a private school and a private entity
not to be state action.
27 531 U.S. 288 (2001). In this case the Supreme Court found state action based on
"entwinement" although in the past it used the phrase "entanglement" for finding state
action. See EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 517 (3d ed. 2006).
28 Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1039 (9th Cir. 2003). See also Mathis v. PG & E, 75
F.3d 498, 503 (9th Cir. 1996).
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private conduct that violates the Constitution. So, for example, courts cannot enforce
restrictive convenants. 29 Generally, however, government licensing or regulating is
not sufficient for a finding of state action unless the government is encouraging or
facilitating unconstitutional conduct.30
As will be demonstrated below, with respect to at least some of its activities,
and in particular disciplinary actions and rule-making, FINRA will be performing
functions that can be considered governmental. The issue, then, is whether persons
affected adversely by such actions have been accorded necessary or appropriate
constitutional or other rights, for example the right to remain silent under the Fifth
Amendment, or administrative law due process guarantees. This article will discuss
some lines of cases in which the courts have treated the NASD or the NYSE as
governmental actors, and other lines of cases in which they have been treated as
private actors. Before turning to these cases, and their implications, this article will
first set forth the history of FINRA, and in particular its regulatory and governance
structure. This history is important because if FINRA were not the successor to
private sector SROs, it might well be considered a state actor.
B. History and Organization of the NASD, NYSE Regulation and FINRA
The NYSE was organized in 1792 to govern securities trading in the wake of
a scandal in the government bond market in the early days of the United States.31
The NASD was formed in 1936, in a restructuring of a trade group known previously
as the Investment Bankers Association of America. 32 Shortly thereafter, the NASD
was authorized as an "association" by the Exchange Act33 and pursuant to that
statutory authorization, the NASD incorporated in Delaware in 1939 and became
registered with the SEC.34
In 1975, the Exchange Act was amended and the SEC obtained greater
authority to regulate and supervise the NYSE,other exchanges and the NASD. The
29 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948). See also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982).
30 See Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
31 See RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 383-84 (2004).
32 See Nagy, supra note 21, at 1023-24.
33 See Exchange Act, § 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (2000).
34 See ESTATE OF Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATIONS § 7-A-3 (3d ed.
2006); Onnig Dombalagian, Demythologizing the Stock Exchange; Reconciling Self-Regulation and
the National Market System, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1069, 1076-77 (2005).
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Securities Acts Amendments of 197535 gave the SEC the power to initiate as well as
approve SRO rule-making, expanded the SEC's role in SRO enforcement and
discipline, and allowed the SEC to play an active role in structuring the public
securities markets.3 6 For the first time, the statute set forth requirements with respect
to the composition of exchange and association boards of directors, so that the
Exchange Act provides that the rules of an exchange or association must "assure a
fair representation of its members in the selection of its directors and administration
of its affairs and provide that one or more directors shall be representative of issuers
and investors and not be associated with a member of the exchange, broker, or
dealer." 37
In 2002, the Exchange Act was again amended to give the SEC further
authority over these SROs. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200238 mandated that stock
exchange rules require listed companies to have independent directors on audit,
compensation and nominating committees, 39 but it did not affect the governance of
SROs. Nevertheless, the SEC has exerted greater power over board composition of
SROs in recent years, requiring a larger number of directors independent of the SRO
and the securities industry.
The NASD was a private not-for-profit Delaware membership corporation
organized pursuant to a statutory system authorizing SROs to act as quasi-
governmental agencies for certain purpose. The NASD promoted its members'
interests but also had statutory authority to sanction members who violated the
NASD's rules or the federal securities laws.40 From its inception, the NASD was a
35 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
36 Exchange Act § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2000); Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. §
78s(c) (2000).
37 Exchange Act § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3) (2000); Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4), 15
U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4) (2000).
38 Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.).
39 See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William 0. Douglas -The
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 79,
92-94,108-113,121-23 (2005).
40 See Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Its
constitution specified that its purposes were:
a. To promote through cooperative effort the investment banking and securities
business, to standardize its principles and practices, to promote therein high standards of
commercial honor, and to encourage and promote among members observance of Federal and
State securities laws;
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peculiar body, designed to act as a regulator, but also functioning as a professional
organization. Initially, the NASD was a nationwide voluntary organization of
broker-dealers engaged in trading over-the-counter ("OTC") stocks. Its membership
was nationwide, large and diverse. Its emphasis was on self-regulation and
discipline by members, as distinguished from regulation by a hired staff, and in
promoting voluntary compliance with ethical standards. 41 Principles emanating from
the Exchange Act and guiding the NASD were democratic organization, business
persons' judgment, and local autonomy.42
In 1971, the NASD launched the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation system ("Nasdaq"), as an electronic stock market. Initially,
Nasdaq was not much more than a computer bulletin board system, and buyers and
sellers continued to be connected by broker-dealers in negotiated trades. As Nasdaq
added trade and volume reporting and automated trading systems, it became more
of a stock market. Today, Nasdaq is completely separated from the NASD, is a
public company, and is recognized by the SEC as a stock exchange.43 Yet, much of
b. To provide a medium through which its membership may be enabled to confer,
consult, and cooperate with governmental and other agencies in the solution of problems
affecting investors, the public, and the investment banking and securities business;
c. To adopt, administer and enforce rules of fair practice and rules to prevent
fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, and in general to promote just and equitable
principles of trade for the protection of investors;
d. To promote self-discipline among members, and to investigate and adjust
grievances between the public and members and between members;
e. To establish, and to register with the [SEC], as a national securities association
pursuant to Section 15A of the [Exchange Act] .... and thereby to provide a medium for
effectuating the purposes of said section;
f. To transact business and to purchase, hold, own lease, mortgage, sell and convey
any and all property, real and personal, necessary, convenient or useful for the purposes of the
NASD." NASD, Inc., NASD Manual, Restated Certificate of Incorporation of NASD, Inc.
(2006).
41 SEC, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKET, H.R. Doc. No. 88-95,
pt. 4, at 679 (1963) [hereinafter Special Study].
42 Id. at 606-07. The NASD was divided into 13 regional districts initially responsible
for enforcing its Rules of Fair Practice, managed by a district committee composed of six to 18
members and a paid staff. Id. at 608. There was a 21-person Board of Governors, nominated
for three year terms by the district committees. Id. at 609. The Board was the center of
responsibility and authority and it functioned through a number of standing committees. The
most active committee was the National Business Conduct Committee which was charged
with oversight of the disciplinary process. Id. at 614. An executive director headed the NASD
staff in Washington, D.C.. Id. at 624-25.
43 Exchange Act Release No. 53,128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23, 2006).
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
what held the NASD together was the economic self-interest of securities dealers in
structuring the trading rules for the OTC market. These rules gave NASD members
the ability to trade with one another at preferential prices.44
Although the efficacy of self-regulation was called into question by stock
market abuses, especially in the OTC market, the 1963 SEC Special Study concluded
that self-regulation should be maintained and strengthened. 45 Self-regulation was
similarly questioned in the mid 1970s, but the Securities Act Amendments of 197546
continued the role of stock exchanges and the NASD as SROs. However, this Act
strengthened the SEC's oversight role by, among other things, giving the SEC the
power to initiate as well as approve SRO rule-making,47 expanding the SEC's role in
SRO enforcement and discipline,48 and allowing the SEC to play an active role in
structuring the trading markets.49 Also, for the first time, the statute set forth
requirements with respect to the composition of exchange and association boards of
directors, providing that the rules of such organizations must "assure a fair
representation of its members in that one or more directors shall be representative of
issuers and investors and not be associated with a member of the [exchange or
association], broker or dealer." 50
The 1975 Act Amendments also created two additional broker-dealers
membership organizations - the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
("SIPC") and the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board ("MSRB.") SIPC's board
members are appointed by a combination of the Secretary of the Treasury, the
Federal Reserve Board and the SEC, although SIPC is a not-for-profit D.C.
corporation.51 The MSRB's members are appointed by the SEC.52 SIPC insures cash
and securities in broker-dealer customer accounts, and oversees broker-dealer
44 See Roger D. Blanc, Intermarket Competition and Monopoly Power in the U.S. Stock
Markets, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. & COM. L. 273, 278 (2007). See also United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec.
Dealers, Inc., 422 U.S. 694 (1975).
45 Special Study, supra note 42, at pt. IV, p. 502.
46 Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975).
47 Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000).
48 Exchange Act § 19(c), (d), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c), (d), (g) (2000).
49 Exchange Act § 11A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1 (2000).
50 Exchange Act § 6(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(a)(3); Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. §
78o-3(b)(4) (2000).
51 15 U.S.C. § 78ccc (2000). See supra note 12.
52 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (2000).
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bankruptcies. The MSRB is a rule-making body. Both SIPC and the MSRB are funded
by assessments on their members.53
The NASD was completely reorganized in 1996 in the wake of a Department
of Justice and SEC investigation into anti-competitive practices by OTC market
makers.54 This proceeding involved a pricing convention by Nasdaq market makers
by which most Nasdaq stocks were quoted in even eighths.5 5 Other abusive market
maker practices were uncovered and the NASD was criticized for its regulatory
deficiencies in failing to discover these practices or discipline its members. The SEC
found that the NASD was unduly influenced by Nasdaq market makers with respect
to rule-making, the disciplinary process and the admission of new members. 56 In a
settlement of these matters, the NASD agreed, among other things, to achieve
greater diversity of representation on its board and its policy-making committees, to
provide for the autonomy and independence of its staff with respect to disciplinary
and regulatory matters, to create an enhanced audit trail and to improve its
surveillance and examination of order handling and the reliability of trade
reporting.57
After the 1996 reorganization, the NASD was comprised of a parent holding
company and two operating subsidiaries - Nasdaq and NASD Regulation, Inc.
("NASDR"). Then, the NASD acquired the American Stock Exchange, which
operated as a separate subsidiary. All four boards were constituency boards,
required to have a majority of non-industry members.58 Procedures for the
appointment to the National Adjudicatory Council ("NAC"), also were specified in
the 1996 restructuring. The NAC consists of from 12 to 14 members, and the number
of non-industry members must equal or exceed the industry members. 59 NASDR
continued to have 11 district committees, each of which had a nominating committee
53 See 78ggg (2000); Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board,
http://www.msrb.org/msrbl/whatsnew/default.asp.
54 Report Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Regarding
the NASD and Nasdaq Market, Exchange Act Release No. 37,542 (Aug. 8, 1996) [hereinafter
Section 21(a) Report].
55 Id. Subsequently, under the threat of congressional legislation, the SROs moved to
decimal pricing. See PLI, THE SEC SPEAKS IN 1999, Corp. L. & Prac. Handbook B-1105, at 115-
119 (1999).56 Section 21(a) Report, supra note 55, at 2.
57 Id. at 3.
58 By-Laws of the NASD, art. VII, § 4(a) (2006); Nasdaq By-Laws, art. IV, § 4.1 (2006);
NASDR By-Laws, art. IV, §§ 4.2, 4.3 (2007), NASD MANUAL, (CCH), 1315,1503,1703-3 (2006).
59 NASDR By-Laws, art. V, § 5.2(a).j
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and served as district business conduct committees. But these district business
conduct committees, which at one time were the mainstay of NASD disciplinary
activity, did not maintain the power they had before 1996 because the NASD
disciplinary cases began to be tried before hearing officers. Further, the NAC
replaced the national business district conduct committee (which was abolished) as
the appeals body for disciplinary cases.60 The end result of all of these changes,
essentially forced upon the NASD in its settlement of the prosecution by the SEC and
Department of Justice, was that the NASDR board, and the NAC, responsible for
disciplining broker-dealers had a minority of industry members and at least some of
the "self" was taken out of the securities industry's primary SRO.
Further changes resulted from the 2000 decision by the NASD membership
to demutualize Nasdaq and turn it into a for-profit public company, a transaction
which then occurred in several stages. 61 An important aspect of this transformation
was that Nasdaq, which previously was registered with the SEC as a securities
information processor became registered as a national stock exchange. 62 In order to
become a public company and a national stock exchange, Nasdaq and NASDR were
forced to engage in years of negotiation with the SEC to obtain the approvals needed
for Nasdaq's demutualization and recognition as an exchange. The SEC also forced a
complete separation of Nasdaq from NASDR.63
In the meantime, governance changes at the NYSE also were demanded by
the SEC in response to scandals. On September 17, 2003, Richard Grasso resigned as
chairman and CEO of the NYSE in the midst of a storm of criticism over his
compensation.64 In addition, a series of major securities cases concerning
questionable and illegal behavior by securities firms and stock exchange specialists, 65
60 NASD Inc., NASD CODE OF PROCEDURE, Rule 9213 (2006).
61 In the matter of the Application of the Nasdaq Stock Market LLC for Registration
as a National Securities Exchange, Exchange Act Release No. 53,128, 71 Fed. Reg. 3550 (Jan. 23,
2006).
62 Id.
63 See id.
64 See Kate Kelly & Susanne Craig, Weakened NYSE Faces Host of Challenges, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 18, 2003, at Cl.
65 See Laurie P. Cohen & Kate Kelly, NYSE Turmoil Poses Question: Can Wall Street
Regulate Itself?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 31, 2003, at Al. In 2005 the United States Attorney's Office
and the SEC charged fifteen specialists for violating federal securities laws through patterns of
fraudulent and improper trading. See Press Release, U.S. Attorney's Office, S.D.N.Y., 15
Current and Former Registered Specialists on the New York Stock Exchange Indicted on
Federal Securities Fraud Charges 1 (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
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raised questions not only about the NYSE's effectiveness as a regulator, but also
about the long term viability of the exchange's floor trading system. 66 In response to
these serious problems, the Interim Chairman and CEO of the NYSE, put forth a
proposal to reorganize the NYSE's board of directors and alter its enforcement arm.
A reconstituted board of directors, of six to twelve members, plus a chairman and
CEO, was put into place. 67 Like the NASD's 1996 reorganization, the NYSE's
changed structure was put in place under the duress of government investigations
and prosecutions and reflected the SEC's ideas of appropriate SRO governance. Also,
like the NASD's 1996 reorganization, this new structure took much of the "self" out
of self-regulation.
Following the NYSE's reorganization, the NYSE also demutualized and
became a public company through a back door merger with Archipelago Holdings,
Inc. ("Arca"), an electronic trading firm.68 In connection with the merger of the NYSE
and Arca, NYSE Regulation, Inc. ("NYSE Regulation") was formed as a separate not-
for-profit subsidiary of NYSE Group. It has a number of structural and governance
features designed to ensure its independence, in addition to its separate not-for-
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nys/PressReleases/ AprilO5/SpecialistlndictmentPR.pdf; Press
Release, SEC, SEC Institutes Enforcement Action Against 20 Former New York Stock
Exchange Specialists Alleging Pervasive Course of Fraudulent Trading (Apr. 12, 2005),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-54.htm. In addition, the SEC charged the
NYSE with failing to police the accused specialists. See Press Release, SEC Charges the New
York Stock Exchange With Failing to Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-53.htm.
66 See Aaron Lucchetti & Kara Scannell, Fifteen Indicted in NYSE Case, WALL ST. J., Apr.
13, 2005, at Cl; New Order At Big Board, Years of Turmoil Give Chief Opening for Change, WALL ST.
J., Apr. 22, 2005, at Al.
67 All of the board members other than the CEO were required to be independent of
management, members and listed companies. This board was then given the responsibility for
appointing a board of executives of twenty-two members, responsive to the exchange's
various constituencies and comprised of institutional investors, listed company CEOs, lessor
members, upstairs firm CEOs, specialist firm CEOs, floor brokers and the NYSE Chair and
CEO. The board of executives was scheduled to meet with the board of directors at least six
times a year to discuss exchange performance, membership issues, listed-company issues and
public issues relating to market structure and performance. See Order Approving Proposed
Rule Change Relating to the Amendment and Restatement of the Constitution of the Exchange
to Reform the Governance and Management Architecture of the Exchange, Exchange Act
Release No. 48,946, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,678, 74,679 (Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter NYSE Constitution
Reform Filing], available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/sro/34-48946.htm.
68 See Redrawing the battle lines, EcoNoMIST, Apr. 30, 2005, at 70.
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
profit form.69 Subsequent to this reorganization, NYSE once again changed its
identity and governance by merging with Euronext, N.V. to form NYSE Euronext,
Inc. ("NYSE Euronext"). 70
The governance changes at both the NASD and the NYSE resulting in the
separation of their market and regulatory functions and the consolidation of NASDR
and the non-market regulatory functions of NYSE Regulation into FINRA need to be
understood against SEC proposed rules on SRO governance 7' and an SEC concept
release on setting forth a variety of models for self-regulation. 72 The SEC's proposed
governance rules for stock exchanges and the NASD would have required that these
SROs and any of their affiliates have boards with a majority of independent
directors 73 and that their nominating, governance, compensation, audit and
regulatory oversight standing committees be composed of independent directors.
These standing committees would have been mandated, and the SEC's proposal sets
forth their minimum purposes and responsibilities.74
69 Each director of NYSE Regulation, other than its CEO, must be independent and a
majority of the members of NYSE Regulation's board and its compensation and nominating
committees must be persons who are not directors of NYSE Group. Its programs are funded
primarily through fees assessed directly on member organizations. NYSE Group, Inc., Annual
Report (Form 10-K), at 41-42 (Mar. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/2502T05-CNB.pdf.
70 After the merger, the NYSE Euronext board of directors consisted of 22 directors,
including an equal number of U.S. and European domiciliaries, of which 11 were NYSE
directors, including the CEO and Chairman of the NYSE. See NYSE Euronext, Inc., Proxy
Statement of NYSE Group, Inc. and Prospectus of NYSE Euronext, Inc. (Form S-4), at 166-67
(Nov. 27, 2006). Since the NYSE remains as a subsidiary of NYSE Euronext, the status of NYSE
Regulation is unchanged.
71 Fair Administration and Governance of Self-Regulatory Organizations, Exchange
Act Release No. 50,699, 69 Fed. Reg. 71,126, 71,134-40, (Dec. 8, 2004) [hereinafter SRO
Governance Release].
72 Concept Release Concerning Self-Regulation, Exchange Act Release No. 50,700, 69
Fed. Reg. 71,256 (proposed Dec. 8, 2004) [hereinafter SRO Concept Release].
73 An "independent director" would be defined as a director who has no material
relationship with an exchange or affiliate of an exchange, or any member of the exchange or
affiliate of a member, or any issuer listed or traded on the exchange. SRO Governance Release,
supra note 72, at 71,214-15 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.6a-5(b)(12)). Further, employment
by an exchange or member within the past three years, or the receipt of $60,000 by the director
or an immediate family member from the exchange or a member within the past year makes a
director not independent. Id. There is a similar definition of an "independent director" for the
NASD. Id. at 71,219 (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.15A-3(b)(13)).
74 SRO Governance Release, supra note 72, at 71,134-40.
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Section 6(b)(3) of the Exchange Act requires that the rules of an exchange
assure a fair representation of its members in the selection of its directors and the
administration of its affairs. Further, an exchange must provide that one or more
directors be representative of issuers and investors and not be associated with a
member of the exchange, broker or dealer.75 The SEC's rule proposal regarding
exchange governance would have required that the nominating committee of the
board administer a fair process that provides members with the opportunity to select
at least 20% of the total number of directors. The SEC asserted that the board could
nevertheless be composed solely of independent directors, so long as 20% of those
independent directors were selected by the exchange's members. This may not be
consonant with the statute, and although it justified the reorganized NYSE board
described above, it transformed the NYSE into an organization without securities
industry members and therefore raised an issue as to whether the NYSE would
continue to be an SRO.76
Both the reorganizations and public offerings of the NYSE and NASD
described above were opposed by some broker-dealers who believed their interests
were not fairly represented in the demutualization and merger of the regulatory
functions of NYSE Regulation and NASDR.77 Essentially, some seat holders believed
they were not adequately compensated for their ownership interests when the NYSE
demutualized and merged with Arca, and they sued the exchange and its CEO and
directors alleging conflicts of interest and breach of fiduciary duties under state
law. 78 This case settled after the defendants lost a motion to dismiss. 79 In connection
with the creation of FINRA, some small broker-dealers who were not NYSE
members brought a lawsuit alleging that their interests had been overrun by the
75 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3) (2000). Section 15A(b)(4) of the Exchange Act contains an
identical requirement applicable to the NASD. 15 U.S.C. 78o-3(b)(4) (2000).
76 See Comment Letter from Edward S. Knight, Exec. Vice President and Gen.
Counsel, Nasdaq, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y, SEC, 11-13 (Mar. 8, 2005) (regarding the
Proposed Rulemaking on SRO Governance (File No. S7-39-04), as well as the Concept Release
Concerning Self-Regulation (File No. S7-40-04)) [hereinafter Nasdaq Comment Letter].
77 See Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Case No. 07Civ.-
2014, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4617 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2007); Aaron Lucchetti & Gregory
Zuckerman, The Ultimate "Mark to Market" Will Seatholders Get Fair Value Under NYSE's
Proposed Deal? The Takeover Battle Takes Shape, WALL ST. J., Apr. 27, 2005, at C1.
78 See Higgins v. N. Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 806 N.Y.S. 2d 339 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
79 Id.; Higgins v. N. Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Index No. 601646/05 (N.Y. Sup. Dec. 5, 2005)
(opinion accepting offer of settlement).
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large NYSE member firms.8 0 This case was dismissed on the ground that the
plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies at the SEC in connection
with the SEC's approval of the NASD's By-Law changes that brought FINRA into
existence. While these cases are to some extent about the economics of these
transactions they also highlight a governance problem. Will FINRA, which was
formed at the urging of the large broker-dealer firms, and under the direction of the
SEC, treat smaller firms and specialists (who were not previously NASD members)
fairly?8' Further, although FINRA continues to be a membership organization, it is
not longer a voluntary SRO.
Both Nasdaq and the Securities Industry Association ("SIA"), a trade group,
strongly objected to the SEC's proposal that exchange boards not include issuer or
member firm representatives. Nasdaq argued that such a regulation would "either
marginalize members and issuers or result in an unwieldy and excessively
bureaucratic decision-making process that is ill suited to a public company."8 2 The
SIA argued that any governance reforms should be consistent with the balance
between SEC oversight of SROs and regulation guided by the direct involvement of
industry participants in both SRO and market functions.8 3
FINRA has a 23-person Board of Governors with 11 seats held by Public
Governors, 9 seats held by Industry Governors, and the remaining 2 seats held by
FINRA's CEO, Mary Schapiro, and the current Chief Regulatory Officer of the NYSE,
Richard Ketchum, serving as the non-executive Chairman of the Board. Of the
industry seats, large firms, consisting of 500 or more registered persons, and small
80 Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Case No. 07-CV 2014,
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32566 (S.D.N.Y. May 2, 2007).
81 FINRA's proposed governance structure will accord these members three
constituency seats on its Board of Governors. See SEC FINRA Approval, supra note 4.
s2 Nasdaq Comment Letter, supra note 77, at 12.
83 Comment Letter from Marc E. Lackritz, President, SIA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec'y,
SEC, 4 (Mar. 9, 2005) (regarding the SRO Governance and Transparency Proposal (File No. S7-
39-04), as well as the SRO Concept Release (File No. S7-40-04)) [hereinafter SIA Comment
Letter]. In addition to mandating a board of independent directors, the SEC proposed that
exchanges and associations effectively separate their regulatory functions from their market
operations and other commercial interests, use regulatory funds only to fund regulatory
obligations, and establish procedures to prevent the dissemination of regulatory information
to third parties. In the SEC's view, the conflicts between an exchange as a market operator and
as a regulator, and as a membership organization and as a regulator, are exacerbated if an
exchange demutualizes and has shareholders to whom it is responsible, and so separation of
the regulatory component of an exchange or association's functions is therefore necessary.
SRO Governance Release, supra note 72, at 71,141.
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firms, consisting of 150 or fewer registered persons, are each guaranteed 3 elective
seats. In addition, NYSE floor members, independent dealer/insurance affiliated
firms, and investment company affiliates are each guaranteed one seat.84
The SEC's preoccupation with the conflicts between an exchange's
regulatory functions and its members, market operations, listed issuers, and
shareholders also prompted the issuance of a concept release on the future of SROs.
Although the concept release detailed these conflicts, it is worth noting that all of
these conflicts have existed for many years, except for the conflict between an
exchange's regulatory functions and shareholders. Further, it can be argued that the
conflicts between exchange regulatory functions and shareholders are less acute
conflicts than between exchange regulatory functions and members. Nevertheless,
the SEC seized upon the approvals needed by Nasdaq and the NYSE in connection
with their transformation from mutualized SROs to demutualized public stock
exchanges as an opportunity to restructure their boards and operations to accord
with the SEC's views on how SROs for broker-dealers and market makers should
function. Have the SEC's dictates regarding board composition and governance for
FINRA and NYSE Regulation transformed these SROs into government agencies?
Under the triparte Lebron test, the answer would be in the negative since the creation
of FINRA did not require a special statute and the SEC does not retain the authority
to appoint a majority of FINRA's directors.85 Yet FINRA could not come into
existence until it was approved by the SEC. FINRA was created in large part to
further the SEC's objectives regarding self-regulation, and the SEC structured its
board. So FINRA comes very close to being an organization that would qualify as a
government agency.
The statute creating the PCAOB specified that the SEC, after consultation
with the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury
would appoint its chairman and board members.8 6 In Free Enterprise Fund v.
84 See SEC FINRA Approval, supra, note 4; Testimony Concerning Consolidation of
NASD and Regulatory Functions of NYSE: Working Towards Improved Regulation Before the U.S. S.
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007) (statement of Mary L.
Schapiro, Chairman and CEO, NASD), available at
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ MaryL.Schapiro/NASDW 019169;
NASD Members Overwhelmingly Approve Plan for New SRO for Member Regulation, 39 SEC. REG &
L. REP. (BNA), Jan. 29, 2007, at 130.
85 See text at supra notes 20-22.
86 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(4)(A) (2002).
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PCAOB,87 the plaintiff made a number of claims that the PCAOB was
unconstitutional, but the claim that has thus far received the most attention is
whether, assuming the PCAOB is a government entity, the method of appointing its
board violates the Appointments Clause of the Constitution.88 If FINRA were held to
be a government entity, these same issues would arise. In order to avoid these
problems, the SEC should be careful to refrain from interfering in the appointment of
persons to FINRA's board. Although the SEC has ventured beyond the securities
laws in designating the characteristics of board members, thus far it has not
suggested or vetoed particular individuals for these slots. Nevertheless, because the
SRO rule-making process is so opaque, it is difficult to know what transpired in the
negotiations between the SEC and the NASD and NYSE Regulation in the approval
proceedings for FINRA.8 9
One argument against a finding that FINRA is a government agency is that it
was advocated by the securities industry as a method for eliminating duplicative
regulation, and the securities industry chooses half of its non-officer board
members.90 Nevertheless, the SEC has assumed so much control over FINRA's
governance that its private sector liability may easily be lost.
The rapid and wrenching changes in the business and regulatory models of
the NYSE and the NASD described in this section are due to technological changes in
the trading of securities in an increasingly globalized capital market and such
regulatory changes as the permitted combination of commercial and investment
banks.91 With the advent of NYSE and Nasdaq as public companies and the creation
of FINRA as a single SRO for broker-dealers, it is appropriate to inquire what kind of
an entity FINRA will be and whether the statutory constraints and SEC oversight of
SROs are sufficient for this new SRO, even if it is not a government agency under the
Lebron test.
87 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
88 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, ci. 2. The Complaint also claimed that the creation of the
PCAOB violated the Separation of Powers Clause, Art. II, §§ 1-2, and was an unconstitutional
delegation. Art. I, § 1.
89 See Lanny Schwartz, Suggestions for Procedural Reform in Securities Market Regulation,
1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 409,431-36 (2007).90 SIA Comment Letter, supra note 84, at 12.
91 See generally Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock Exchange: The
Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355 (2007). The Gramm-Leach
Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-02, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) repealed the Glass-Steagall barriers
between commercial and investment banking.
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II. Immunity form Suit, Fifth Amendment Claims and Compulsory Arbitration
A. Introduction
Two diametrically opposed lines of cases involve the immunity of SROs
from damage actions and the ability of persons under investigation by SROs to claim
their privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. In the former,
the courts have treated SROs as if they were government entities. In the latter, the
courts have refused to grant persons under investigation the right to claim the Fifth
Amendment on the ground that SROs are private bodies. In cases challenging
compulsory SRO arbitration, the courts have similarly sometimes viewed SROs as
government actors, and sometimes viewed SROs as private actors.
In some cases, the courts have tried to distinguish between the commercial
and regulatory functions of an SRO, but viewed in their totality, the holdings of
these cases are impossible to reconcile. Possibly, they can be justified on policy
grounds as necessary for SROs to effectively perform their regulatory functions. The
courts have given deference to SRO conduct and arguments so as not to interfere
with their regulatory responsibilities, in apparent disregard of the serious
discrepancies in judicial precedents. Perhaps the public/private distinctions
involving SROs are neither necessary nor helpful, and instead the inquiry should be
whether under the circumstances, there are adequate protections for affected
persons.92
An appreciation of these cases requires a brief understanding of the rule-
making and disciplinary functions of SROs, and the SEC's oversight of these
activities. Self-regulation always involved the promulgation of conduct rules for SRO
members. Indeed, self-regulation was frequently justified as a system for imposing
ethical as well as legal standards on securities industry professionals.9 3 These ethical
standards are captured in the concept of "just and equitable principles of trade," or
rules of fair practice. Although these general concepts can still form the basis for
disciplinary proceeding, in general, SRO standards are now contained in lengthy and
detailed rule-books of NYSE Regulation and the NASD. One of the rationales for
combining these entities into FINRA is that these rules are frequently contradictory
92 See Chris Sagers, The Myth of "Privatization," 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 37 (2007); Paul R.
Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963,979-87 (2005).
93 See THE REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 13, at 149 (1st
Sess. 1973).
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or duplicative and the industry should be governed by a single rule-book.94 These
rules cover a wide variety of substantive negative and affirmative obligations of
broker-dealers relating to the prevention of fraud and manipulation in securities
offerings and trading; protection of broker-dealers and their customers from undue
financial risk and insolvency; and fair dealing by broker-dealers with their
customers.
The SEC has oversight with respect to all SRO rule-making. Section 19(b)(1)
of the Exchange Act requires that all SROs file proposed rule changes with the SEC.
If the SEC does not institute disapproval proceedings within 35 days of the proposed
rule's publication, unless extended by the SEC to 90 days, the proposed rule becomes
effective.95 In reality, rule changes do not take effect this way. Generally, SROs
consent to a waiver of the 35 day effectiveness period and there are long periods of
negotiation between an SRO and the SEC as to whether a new rule can become
effective as written.96 The SEC also has the power to "abrogate, add to, and delete
from" the rules of an SRO, but this power is rarely utilized.97
SROs have broad authority to investigate and prosecute violations of their
own rules and also the violations of the federal securities laws.98 The NASD also
enforces the rules of the MSRB. 99 SRO sanctions can range from censure to
suspension to a permanent bar of broker-dealer and associated persons licensed to
engage in the securities business. Further, these sanctions overlap the ability of the
SEC to discipline securities firms and personnel either in administrative proceedings
or injunctive actions. Conduct that violates SRO rules and federal securities law
regulations has also resulted in criminal prosecutions. 100
Members of stock exchanges and the NASD have long been required to
submit to arbitration of disputes among themselves. Securities arbitration between
94 See Schapiro, supra note 85; NASD Members Overwhelmingly Approve Plan for New
SRO for Member Regulation, supra note 85.
95 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(1) (2000).
96 See Lanny Schwartz, supra note 90.
97 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000). In one of the few instances where the SEC utilized this
power, the rule in question was overturned by the District of Columbia Circuit Court. Bus.
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F. 2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
98 See Exchange Act § 15A(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(7) (2000).
99 See id.; Blount v. SEC, 61 F.3d 938, 941 (D.C. Cir. 1995). The MSRB is an SRO for
municipal securities brokers and dealers. See supra notes 52-53.
100 See, e.g., D.L. Cromwell Inv., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 279 F.3d 155 (2d Cir.
2002).
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broker-dealers and their customers has been compelled since the Supreme Court
permitted contracts to this effect in 1987.101 SRO arbitration facilities have a Uniform
Code of Arbitration promulgated by the Securities Industry Conference on
Arbitration, and changes in these rules are subject to SEC oversight as are all other
SRO rules. The arbitration facilities of the NYSE and the NASD will be combined in a
separate entity as part of FINRA.
B. Immunity From Suit
The NASD, NYSE and other securities industry SROs have been found to be
immune from suit when acting in their regulatory and general oversight functions.
To this extent they have been treated like government entities. In some cases, the
courts have treated SROs as having the same immunity from suit for conduct falling
within the scope of their regulatory and oversight functions as the SEC would have
because they are performing the functions of a government agency which would
have sovereign immunity. 10 2 In some cases, the SROs are described as acting
pursuant to "delegated" governmental authority. 10 3 In other cases, the SRO's actions
are described as "quasi-governmental." 104 The courts have reasoned that if the SROs
could be sued for damages in connection with exercising their regulatory
responsibilities, they would be discouraged from engaging in the effective self-
regulation required by statute.10 5
Other cases have referenced the immunity of government officials from suits
as provided in Butz v. Economou,10 6 in which a futures commission merchant sued the
Secretary of Agriculture and other officials for their actions in bringing an
administrative proceeding. Although the appeals court held that the officials had
only a qualified immunity, the Supreme Court held that where officials decide to
101 Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987). See also Rodrigues
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
102 Barbara v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 99 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 1996). See also Scher v. Nat'l Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 218 F. App'x 46 (2d Cir. 2007).
103 E.g., Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp.2d 260 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
104 In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007); DL Capital Group LLC
v. Nasdaq Stock Mkt., Inc., No. 03 Civ. 9730 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7955 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2004);
D'Alessio v. New York Stock Exch., Inc., 125 F. Supp.2d 656 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
105 Dexter v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp.2d 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2005);
Trama v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., No. 78 Civ 4898, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15543 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 14,
1978).
106 438 U.S. 478 (1978).
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
initiate or continue a disciplinary proceeding subject to agency adjudication they are
entitled to absolute immunity from damages.1 07 In cases involving the prosecutorial
or adjudicatory functions of SROs, the courts generally have granted them absolute
immunity.1 8 In one interesting case where the SEC set aside an NASD sanction, a
broker sued the NASD for malicious prosecution. The court held that, although not
prosecutors, the NASD investigators were acting in a prosecutorial capacity and
therefore were entitled to absolute immunity from suit.10 9
An important recent case, In re NYSE Specialists Securities Litigation (California
Public Employees' Retirement System v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.), 10 was a class
action against the NYSE under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act for
failing to provide a fair and orderly market, upon which the plaintiffs relied in
trading on that exchange. This case followed an SEC investigation into NYSE
specialist firm misconduct and the settlement of an enforcement action against the
NYSE for failing adequately to monitor and police specialist trading activity."' Five
types of specialist misconduct were alleged in the complaint and the plaintiffs
alleged that the NYSE was guilty of a "complete and utter failure" to regulate the
conduct of its specialist firms during the class period of 1999-2003.112 The complaint
also alleged that the NYSE repeatedly made public statements during the period
about its oversight which created "the false impression" that the NYSE was
appropriately supervising its auction market in accordance with applicable laws and
regulations. Investors were therefore led to believe that the NYSE "was an honest
and fair market," and they relied on these misstatements in trading NYSE listed
stocks. 113
The NYSE moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that it was
entitled to absolute immunity from claims stemming from either its active or passive
107 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) the Court distinguished between
absolute immunity situations and situations which give only qualified immunity because
statutory or constitutional rights have been implicated. See also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
108 Austin Mun. Sec., Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 757 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1985);
Shah v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, No. 98 C 5355, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6467 (D. Ill. 1999);
Manelbaum v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 894 F. Supp. 676, 680-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
109 Zandford v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs Dealers, 30 F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 1998).
110 503 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2007).
111 See Press Release, SEC Charges the New York Stock Exchange with Failing to
Police Specialists (Apr. 12, 2005), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-53.htm.
112 503 F.3d at 93.
113 Id.
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complicity in the specialist firms' misconduct. This motion was granted by the
district court, but the Second Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Referring
to a series of Second Circuit precedents, the court held that the NYSE has absolute
immunity where an activity relates to the proper functioning of the regulatory
system it is administering. Specifically, where the "'alleged misconduct falls within
the scope of the quasi-governmental powers delegated to the NYSE,' absolute
immunity attaches."11 4
The plaintiffs argued that prior decisions protected an SRO in cases
involving the affirmative assertion of regulatory power, but not where an SRO has
abandoned its duty to regulate. The Second Circuit disagreed, deciding that absolute
immunity should protect an SRO not only when it decides to act, but also when it
decides not to act. This is because the purpose of absolute immunity is to give
government officials, or those acting with delegated governmental powers,
"breathing room to exercise their powers without fear that their discretionary
decisions may engender endless litigation."1' 5 The issue is not whether the SRO is
acting consistently with the laws it is supposed to enforce, but whether the plaintiff's
allegations concern the exercise of powers within the bounds of the government
functions delegated to it. Applying this analysis, the court believed it was clear that
the alleged misconduct fell within the ambit of the quasi-governmental functions
delegated to the NYSE by the SEC. Further, the court declined to fashion a fraud
exception to such immunity.
With regard to the misrepresentation claim, however, the Second Circuit
reversed and remanded. This was because the district court had dismissed the case
on the theory that an action under Rule 10b-5 lies only against the issuer of a security
for false statements about the security. The court thought this theory was wrong, but
it expressed skepticism that the plaintiffs could successfully argue reliance. The
question of whether the alleged misrepresentations related to the NYSE's
commercial role, rather than its regulatory role, was not discussed. Such a distinction
was, however, the basis for Weissman v. NASD," 6 a case in the Eleventh Circuit.
Steven Weissman was a purchaser of WorldCom, Inc. ("Worldcom") stock,
allegedly purchased in reliance on Nasdaq's misrepresentations in advertisements
114 Id. at 96 (quoting from D'Alessio v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 258 F.3d 93, 106 (2d Cir.
2001)).
115 Id. at 97.
116 468 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2006), aff'd, 500 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2007).
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promoting WorldCom stock. He brought a diversity suit under Florida blue sky law,
alleging that Nasdaq expended $74 million during 2000 and 2001 on advertising.
This advertising campaign featured Nasdaq listed companies, including WorldCom.
The Eleventh Circuit, affirming the denial of a motion to dismiss on immunity
grounds, held that while Nasdaq enjoys absolute immunity for statutorily-mandated
prosecutorial, regulatory or disciplinary functions, Nasdaq wase not entitled to
immunity with regard to its for-profit commercial activities. The only activity in the
case held to be immune was posting WorldCom's financials on Nasdaq's web site. A
dissenting judge expressed the view that the gist of Weissman's complaint was that
Nasdaq continued to list WorldCom in order to increase its profits after it knew or
should have known that WorldCom was in trouble. In addition to believing that this
was essentially a regulatory decision, the dissent argued that the majority opinion
was an untenable precedent.
The difficulty with the majority's decision was demonstrated by the hair-
splitting which occurred in a later decision en banc, which involved a particular
advertisement in the Wall Street Journal. After the Enron fraud came to light, in
April, 2002, Nasdaq took out a two full page spread advertisement in the Wall Street
Journal, discussing the need for Nasdaq listed companies to provide accurate
financial reporting, supported by a knowledgeable audit committee. On the opposite
page, a list of CEOs of the "good" Nasdaq listed companies included Bernard J.
Ebbers, CEO of Worldcom. According to the complaint, this ad suggested that
WorldCom and its CEO were endorsed by Nasdaq as "having a good character,
accounting done in accordance with GAAP, and a viable audit committee in
accordance with N[ASDAQ] listing requirements."11 7 The Eleventh Circuit en banc
decision concluded, in a very short majority opinion, that Nasdaq's advertising
activity did not serve an adjudicatory, regulatory or prosecutorial function, and
therefore absolute immunity was properly denied by the district court. The
concurring opinion, joined by four judges, took the position that the Wall Street
Journal ads were quasi-governmental conduct because they communicated to
investors that Nasdaq companies had to satisfy rigorous financial disclosure
standards, and the establishment of these standards was delegated to Nasdaq by the
SEC.
117 Id. at 1312.
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A California district court case was guided to some extent by Weissman in
trying to draw a line between an SRO's governmental and commercial functions in
Opulent Fund, L.P. v. Nasdaq.u18 The plaintiffs were private investment partnerships
that trade in stock index options, including options derived from the value of the
Nasdaq-100 index. This index is weighted by the market value of the component
securities in the index, according to a computational method which the SEC has
reviewed and approved. The complaint alleged that on May 9, 2006, Nasdaq
negligently miscalculated and announced the opening price of the index, resulting in
a significant loss on options contracts held by the plaintiff. The case was brought
under California statutory and common law for negligent misrepresentation.
Nasdaq argued that in calculating the opening price of the index, it was discharging
duties under the Exchange Act and therefore was entitled to absolute immunity. The
court disagreed, and refused to dismiss the suit, holding that the pricing of an index
by Nasdaq was not a regulatory function, but part of its for-profit commercial
activities.
Now that FINRA, the NYSE and Nasdaq are separate entities, it would
appear that FINRA will not have too much difficulty claiming immunity for its
activities which would appear to be primarily, if not entirely, adjudicatory,
prosecutorial or regulatory. The NYSE and Nasdaq may have a more difficult time,
however, claiming immunity now that they are for-profit public companies, even
though they continue to regulate their own markets.
C. Fifth Amendment Pleas
Curiously, in what would seem to be a related area to immunity from suit-
the ability of persons under investigation by SROs for securities law violations to
assert Fifth Amendment protections-the courts have not viewed the NYSE and
NASD as governmental agencies and have not generally granted the targets of SRO
investigations a right to claim their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.1 9 [FIX LINE BREAK]Because SROs do not have subpoena power,
their members are required to "voluntarily" cooperate with investigators and
provide testimony and documents. Failure to cooperate can result in sanctions
118 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,462 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 12, 2007).
119 See, e.g., Jones v. SEC, 115 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975). But see In Re Quattrone, Exchange Act Rel. No. 53,547,
2006 SEC LEXIS 703 (Mar. 24, 2006).
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ranging from censure to a bar from the securities business. Historically, the NYSE
imposed a bar for non-cooperating witnesses until they were willing to cooperate,120
while the NASD imposed a permanent bar against witnesses who refused to
testify.121 In one case the SEC justified the necessity for the NASD's testimonial
compulsion as necessary for its regulatory responsibilities, but reversed a permanent
bar, suggesting that the NASD review the appropriateness of this sanction.122
Similarly, in PAZ Securities, Inc. v. SEC,123 the D.C. Circuit remanded a case where
the NASD had permanently barred an associated person for failing to respond to
requests for information, where the SEC had affirmed the bar without addressing
potentially mitigating factors. The court viewed such a bar as the industry equivalent
of capital punishment, and the court held that the SEC was required to explain why
such a severe sanction was remedial rather than punitive. 124
The reasoning of the cases described above, giving SROs immunity from
suit, is that this immunity is necessary for SROs to exercise their regulatory functions
effectively. Similarly, cases denying persons under investigation by SROs the right to
plead their privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment are
justified on the grounds that since SROs do not have subpoena power, they could
not effectively operate as regulators if they could not bar persons from continuing to
be associated with member firms for their failure to cooperate when they refuse to
testify or produce documents in an investigation.125 Nevertheless, in a number of
cases, persons investigated by SROs and subsequently charged in criminal actions
for the same conduct have argued that the sanction of being barred from the
securities business for non-cooperation is essentially a deprivation of their Fifth
Amendment constitutional right because the Supreme Court has held that a witness
cannot be deprived of his employment for declining to provide testimony that could
used against the witness in a criminal prosecution. 126
120 NYSE Rule 477; In the matter of Brian D. Stoker, NYSE Hearing Panel Dec. 05-103
(Dec. 19, 2005) and cases cited therein.
121 NASD Rule 8310; In the matter of Robert J. Langley, Exchange Act Release No.
50917, 2004 SEC LEXIS 3048 (Dec. 22, 2004).
122 2004 SEC LEXIS 3048.
123 494 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
124 Id. at 1062-63.
125 See, e.g., Dep't of Enforcement v. Steinhart, 2003 NASD Discip. LEXIS 23 (NASD
Discip. 2003); In re Fierro, Exchange Act Release No. 39,544, 53 SEC Docket 434 (Jan. 13, 1998).
126 See, e.g., Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70 (1973); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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The key case relied upon when a denial of Fifth Amendment rights is
claimed is United States v. Solomon,1 27 in which testimony by an officer of a NYSE
member firm was used to indict him. The defendant in the criminal case argued that
the NYSE had become an arm of the government, so the Fifth Amendment privilege
excluding involuntary confessions from evidence should apply. The Second Circuit
held that the actions of the NYSE were those of a private body and not the
government and therefore the Fifth Amendment privilege was unavailable. The
court stated: "This is but one of many instances where the government relied on self-
policing by private organizations to effectuate the purposes underlying federal
regulating statutes."128 Similarly, in Jones v. SEC,1 29 the Fourth Circuit rejected a claim
based on the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause on the ground that the
NASD is not a government agency. These precedents have been followed in district
court cases.130 In a case where a party argued that the NASD is a quasi-governmental
agency, the court held to the contrary, stating: "NASD is not a government agency: it
is a private, not-for-profit corporation chartered in Delaware. It received no funding
from any government, federal or state." 131
In recent years, the claims that the constitutional rights of persons under
SRO investigation have been compromised have become more vociferous because of
the simultaneous actions and cooperation of SROs, the SEC and the Department of
Justice in the prosecution of securities industry professionals. The SEC has begun to
acknowledge that under some circumstances, an SRO may be acting as an agent for
the government in conducting an investigation. In Frank P. Quattrone,132 a person
under investigation acknowledged that he failed to respond to an NASD request for
information, contending that he had a Fifth Amendment right not to respond
because his requested testimony related to a joint investigation by the SEC, the
NASD and the NYSE into spinning and research analyst conflicts of interest at 12
broker-dealer firms. He claimed the NASD investigation was therefore "state
127 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
128 Id. at 869.
129 115 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (4thCir. 1997).
130 See, e.g., D.L. Cromwell Invs., Inc. v. NASD Regulation, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d 248
(S.D.N.Y. 2001); Datek Sec. Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 230, 234
(S.D.N.Y. 1995); SEC v. Musella, 1983 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17999 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
131 Graman v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, No. 97-1556-JR, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11624,
at *5-6 (D.D.C. 1998).
132 Exchange Act Release No. 53,547, 2006 SEC LEXIS 703 (Mar. 24, 2006).
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action." At a proceeding before a Hearing Panel, Frank P. Quattrone ("Quattrone")
refused to testify in view of a related pending criminal indictment against him. The
NAC increased the hearing panel's sanction to a bar in all capacities because it
"found that Quattrone's misconduct in refusing to testify was egregious." 133 The SEC
reversed and remanded, holding that Quattrone had the right to present evidence
that the NASD's role in the joint investigation rendered its request for information
and testimony state action.134
Justin F. Ficken ("Ficken") was a former associated person of an NASD
member firm who refused to provide testimony in an investigation into improper
market timing and late trading in mutual fund shares. A Hearing Panel barred
Ficken from associating with any NASD member in any capacity, and the NAC
affirmed this sanction, finding that Ficken's "unsubstantiated, generalized assertion"
that NASD staff had forwarded documents to the SEC and the Department of Justice
did not support a finding of state action.135 The SEC reversed and remanded, giving
Ficken the opportunity to conduct discovery to prove his allegations of joint action
between the NASD and the SEC, but noted that "cooperation between the
Commission and NASD will rarely render NASD a state actor, and the mere fact of
such cooperation is generally insufficient, standing alone, to demonstrate state
action."136 A similar opportunity to prove state action in an NYSE proceeding where
a specialist was barred for asserting the Fifth Amendment in an investigation was
afforded in Warren E. Turk.137
A better procedural approach to granting the Fifth Amendment privilege is
provided by the PCAOB. The PCAOB has the power of investigation similar to
SROs, and can suspend or bar a public accounting firm or associated person who
refuses to testify.138 In addition, if a witness refuses to cooperate, the PCAOB may
request that the SEC issue a subpoena. Further, the PCAOB is required to coordinate
its investigations of potential securities law violations with the SEC.139 Perhaps for
these reasons, the PCAOB explicitly permits witnesses to claim a Fifth Amendment
133 Id. at *8.
134 Id. at *11.
135 In re Ficken, Exchange Act Release No. 54699, 2006 SEC LEXIS 2547, at *11 (Nov. 3,
2006).
136 Id. at 11.
137 Exchange Act Release No. 55,942 (June 22, 2007).
138 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 105, 15 U.S.C. § 7215 (2002).
139 Id.
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privilege, but it has reserved the right to draw an adverse inference from the
assertion of such a claim. 140 With the recent recognition by the SEC that many SRO
investigations are joint investigations with the SEC and the Department of Justice,
and the D.C. Circuit's caution that a permanent bar is a severe sanction which must
be justified, it seems appropriate for the SROs similarly to provide for Fifth
Amendment pleas by persons under SRO investigation. If this unduly hampers SRO
investigations, two solutions are possible: first, a temporary suspension until the
witness decides to testify; or second, subpoena assistance from the SEC. The
imposition of a permanent bar by SROs for failure to testify would appear to be ill
advised in view of legal developments with regard to this area.
D. Arbitration Facilities
Compulsory arbitration between member firms and member firms and their
employees has generally been viewed as a matter of private contract, a condition of
being a member of an SRO. Similarly, contractual arbitration provisions between
member firms and their customers have been upheld. Nevertheless, SRO arbitration
has proven controversial for a variety of reasons, most of which are not directly
relevant to this article.141 With the formation of FINRA, the arbitration facilities of the
NASD and the NYSE were combined into a single subsidiary. 42
In Desiderio v. NASD,143 the plaintiff argued that her Fifth and Seventh
Amendment rights were violated by the NASD when she was required to agree to an
arbitration provision in her offer of employment as a securities broker. The court
held that the SEC had not compelled the NASD to require arbitration and that there
was no state action. According to the court, the NASD "is a private corporation that
140 See PCAOB Rule 5106; PCAOB Rulemaking, Proposed Rules Relating to
Investigations and Adjudications, Exchange Act Release No. 49,454, 2004 SEC LEXIS 644 (Mar.
19, 2004); PCAOB Rulemaking Order Approving Rules Relating to Investigations and
Adjudications, Exchange Act Release No. 49,704, 2004 SEC LEXIS 1018 (May 14, 2004).
141 See Marilyn Blumberg Cane & Marc J. Greenspon, Securities Arbitration: Bankrupt,
Bothered & Bewildered, 7 STAN. J. L. Bus. & FIN. 131 (2002); Jennifer J. Johnson, Wall Street Meets
The Wild West: Bringing Law and Order to Securities Arbitration, 84 N. C. L. REV. 123 (2005); David
S. Ruder, Elements of a Fair and Efficient Securities Arbitration System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1101
(1998); Marc I. Steinberg, Securities Arbitration: Better for Investors Than the Courts?, 62 BROOK. L.
REV. 1503 (1996).
142 See Press Release, NASD, NASD and NYSE Group Announce Plan to Consolidate
Regulation of Securities Firms, (Nov. 28, 2006), available at
http://www.nasd.com/PressRoom/NewsReleases/2006newsreleases/NASDW_017963.
143 191 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 1999).
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receives no federal or state funding. Its creation was not mandated by statute, nor
does the government appoint its members or serve on any NASD board or
committee. Moreover, the fact that a business entity is subject to 'extensive and
detailed' state regulation does not convert that organization's actions into those of
the state."144
A rather different result was obtained in cases involving California Ethics
Standards for Neutral Arbitrators in Contractual Arbitration ("California
Standards"), which in certain respects were in conflict with NASD and NYSE rules
relating to arbitrations. In Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.145 a federal district court
held that the California Standards were preempted by both the Exchange Act and
the Federal Arbitration Act. The court found conflicts between the SROs and
California Standards with regard to arbitrator disclosures, control of the case by the
SRO Director of Arbitration as opposed to the parties under court supervision, and
the applicability of the California Standards in SRO dispute resolution cases. Further,
the court found that SROs are an integral part of the federal regulatory scheme
administered by the SEC and that an important function of the SROs was the
conduct of arbitrations. If SROs were forced to comply with the California Standards
they would become subject to a patchwork of state regulation at odds with their
national function. In Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald,146 a federal circuit
court subsequently held that SEC approval of SRO rules preempted the California
Standards.
In Jevne v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County,147 a California appellate
court also held that the California Standards were preempted by the Exchange Act,
but on narrower grounds. The court thought that there was no actual conflict
between the arbitrator disclosure provisions of the California Standards and SRO
procedural rules, but that the added disclosure provisions were nevertheless an
obstacle to the SRO procedures because the California standards would increase the
costs and complexity of and inject uncertainty into the arbitration process and
144 Id. at 206, citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
145 Mayo v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 1097, amended by 260 F. Supp.
2d 979 (N.D. Cal. 2003); accord Wilmot v. McNabb, 269 F. Supp.2d 1203 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The
court in Mayo also held that the California Standards were preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act because they interfered with the contractual provisions between a broker-
dealer and its customer to arbitrate according to SRO procedural rules.
146 400 F.3d 119 (9th Cir. 2005).
147 Jevne v. Superior Court, 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2006).
Vol 14:1
Fall 2008 Should Securities Industry Self-Regulatory Organizations 183
Be Considered Government Agencies?
therefore frustrate the Exchange Act's purpose of protecting investors and the
public. In view of the SEC's intense oversight in the area of SRO arbitrations, the
court was reluctant to second guess the federal agency on this matter. With respect
to the procedures for arbitrator disqualification, the court did find a direct conflict
between the California Standards and SRO procedural rules, and therefore found
preemption on this ground as well. In these cases SRO rules were essentially treated
as SEC rules, and the SROs were therefore essentially regarded as state actors.
The creation of FINRA generated some adverse comments on the
combination of NYSE and NASD arbitration, to the effect that investor rights would
be reduced by cutting the number of available arbitration venues in half.148 The SEC
found that the combination of SRO arbitration facilities was consistent with the
Exchange Act and would take advantage of economies of scale.149 As the SEC noted,
the criticisms of compelled arbitration go beyond the issues of FINRA's creation. Yet,
if FINRA is for some purposes exercising delegated governmental functions, is this
compelled broker-dealer-customer arbitration forum an alternative federal court? If
so, how should it be governed and operated and how should arbitrators be selected?
IV. Due Process Rights of Persons Subject to FINRA
If FINRA were held to be a government entity, persons subject to its
regulation would have a variety of constitutional and statutory rights applicable to
those who deal with federal administrative agencies. In addition to basic
constitutional protections, the Administrative Procedure Act,150 the Freedom of
Information Act 1 51 and the Government in the Sunshine Act 152 could become
148 SEC FINRA Approval, supra note 4, at 36.
149 Id. at 86, 89.
150 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1994) (applying to "each authority of the Government of the
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by another agency... " The SEC
is covered by this definition. Commercial Capital Corp. v. SEC, 360 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir.
1966).
151 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1) (2002) (covering "any independent regulatory agency"). In
Independent Investor Protective League v. NYSE, 367 F. Supp. 1376, 1377 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), the
court held that the NYSE was not an "agency" under the Freedom of Information Act because
it was not an authority of the Government of the United States but rather a not-for-profit
corporation of the State of New York. Since then, there has been litigation as to whether
advisory committees or consultants of federal agencies are subject to this statute. See, e.g.,
Wash. Research Project, Inc. v. Dep't of Health, Ed. & Welfare, 504 F.2d 238, 245 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. den. 421 U.S. 963 (1974) Wash. Legal Found. v. Am. Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on
Fed. Judiciary, 648 F. Supp. 1353, 1354 (D.C. 1986).
152 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1995).
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applicable to the deliberations, rule-making procedures and disciplinary activities of
FINRA and possibly other SROs. A wide variety of other statutes and regulations
could apply to the funding, budgeting, contracting activities and other operations of
the SROs. The SROs would be turned into government bureaucracies and would not
be able to recruit personnel, pay salaries and operate in the manner in which they
have long conducted themselves. These problems will become apparent at the
PCAOB if that body is declared a government entity. Currently, even though the
PCAOB affords the auditing firms and accountants subject to its jurisdiction certain
rights, it denies that it is subject to the constraints applicable to government
agencies. 53
At one time, SROs denied their members certain rights commonly viewed as
fundamental in connection with their investigations and disciplinary proceedings.
For example, persons under investigation were not entitled to bring counsel to
investigative hearings. 5 4 By reason of the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, the
SEC's oversight of the NYSE, the NASD and other SROs was made consistent and
assured that all members of SROs would be treated fairly in connection with
investigations and disciplinary proceedings. In addition, since 1975, all SRO rules
have been required to be approved by the SEC, and in that process they become
subject to the notice and comment process.
Under the Exchange Act, the rules of an exchange must "assure a fair
representation of its members in the selection of its directors and administration of
its affairs." 155 In addition, the rules of the exchange must "provide for the equitable
allocation of reasonable dues, fees and other charges among its members and issuers
and other persons using its facilities." 156 With respect to discipline, SROs must
provide a "fair procedure" which includes bringing specific charges, notifying a
153 See Comment Letter from Deloitte & Touche, LLP to SEC, File No. PCAOB-2003-07
(Apr. 15, 2004), PCAOB Proposed Rules on Investigations and Adjudications, Apr. 15, 2004, at
53.
'54 See Villani v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1191 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), affid sub
nom. Sloan v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 489 F.2d 1, 2 (2d Cir. 1973).
155 Exchange Act § 6(b)(3) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(3) (2000)). Before it became
an exchange, a similar provision applied to the NASD. Exchange Act § 15A(b)(4) (codified as
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(4) (2000)).
156 Exchange Act § 6(b)(4) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(4) (2000)). Before it became
an exchange, a similar provision applied to the NASD. Exchange Act § 15A(b)(5) (codified as
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(5) (2000)).
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person subject to discipline and giving him an opportunity to defend against such
charges and keeping a record. Further, in order to impose a sanction, there needs to
be a statement setting forth the act or practice in which the member engaged or
omitted, the provisions of the regulation(s) violated and the sanction and reason for
its imposition. 5 7 A person who has been sanctioned by an exchange or association
has a right to appeal from a decision by the trier of fact to the SRO board or other
committee, which in the case of the NASD has been the NAC.15 8 A further appeal to
the SEC also is provided. 159 In most respects, all of these due process rights are
similar to the rights granted to persons subject to SEC disciplinary proceedings. 160 As
pointed out by the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs when
the 1975 Act Amendments were drafted, since the SROs "exercise government
power . . .by imposing a disciplinary sanction, broadly defined, on a member or
person affiliated with a member . .. [they] must be required to conform their
activities to fundamental standards of due process." 161
All SRO new rules and rule changes must be filed with the SEC and
approved by the SEC before they can become effective. 162 In addition, the SEC can
abrogate, add to or delete from existing SRO rules.163 In the course of this rule-
making approval process, any new SRO rules or amendments are put out for
comment, and the comments are considered by the SEC in its determination as to
whether to approve the SRO's filing. The Senate Committee Report on the 1975 Act
Amendments to the Exchange Act criticized the fact that SROs did not have to
explain or justify their rule proposals and expressed the view that the SEC should
require a "concise general statement of the basis and purpose" of proposed rule
157 Exchange Act § 6(d)(1) (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(7), 78o-3(h)(1) (2000)).
158 See National Adjudicatory Council, FINRA Regulatory Enforcement (NAC),
available at http://www.finra.org/Industry/Enforcement/Adjudication/NAC/index.htm.
159 Exchange Act § 19(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d)(2) (2000).
160 See SEC Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. §§ 201-1106. Prior to 1975, these procedural
rights were afforded to persons subject to NASD discipline, but not stock exchange discipline.
See SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES OF S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES
INDUSTRY STUDY, S. Doc. No. 13, at 150-51 (1st Sess. 1973).
161 S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING & URBAN AFFAIRS, SECURITIES ACT AMENDMENTS OF
1975, REP. No. 94-75, at 24-25 (1975). The Committee also noted that SROs can adversely affect
the interests of particular persons by denying membership to an applicant or requiring
members to case doing business in specified ways. Id.
162 Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2000).
163 Exchange Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (2000).
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changes in order to hold SROs "to the same standards of policy justification that the
Administrative Procedure Act imposes on the SEC."164
While the SROs would deny that they are governmental entities subject to
the Administrative Procedure Act, all of the procedures set forth above essentially
guarantee that the procedures of the Act relating to disciplinary proceedings and
rule-making are followed. The degree of SEC oversight of these processes is
extensive, perhaps at times overly rigid and bureaucratic. To subject disciplinary
proceedings and rule-making to greater scrutiny by declaring that SROs are subject
to the constitutional and administrative law protections applicable to government
agencies would probably ossify the work of the SROs, and would not necessarily be
useful. 165 At the same time, to the extent that SROs do not afford persons subject to
their discipline ample due process protections in their disciplinary and rule-making
processes, the legitimacy of SRO action is undermined and an SRO could be subject
to adverse court review.166
V. SRO Rule-Making to Displace Anti-Trust Regulation and State Laws
A. General
One of the interesting aspects of SRO rule-making is that an NASD or NYSE
rule can create a conflict with state laws or federal anti-trust laws. If the SRO rule is
then viewed as federal securities regulation, it can displace state law or anti-trust
law. There have been only a few cases where preemption of state law has occurred
because of an SRO rule, but FINRA rule-making could create more such conflicts in
the future. Although there have been more cases of conflict between SRO rules and
the anti-trust laws, a recent Supreme Court case 167 giving the SEC considerable
leeway in displacing the anti-trust laws will probably lead to fewer such cases in the
future.
Of particular importance with regard both to state law and to anti-trust law
conflicts with SRO rules is the NASD Corporate Financing Rule.168 Like all NASD
rules, this rule applies to NASD members but affects the structure of initial public
offerings ("IPOs") because it regulates underwriters' compensation. This is a merit
164 S. REP. No. 94-75, at 29.
165 Cf. Metzger, supra note 17, at 1408-09, 1456.
166 See Silver v. NYSE, 373 U.S. 341 passim (1963).
167 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2396 (2007).
168 NASD Rule 2710, SEC Release No. 34-30587 (Apr. 15, 1992).
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regulation analogous to state blue sky merit regulation, which enabled state
commissioners to determine whether underwritings were "fair, just and
equitable." 169 Administration of such statutes included a review of a corporation's
capitalization and the sale of cheap stock to underwriters and insiders. Similarly, a
wide variety of arrangements between underwriters and issuers are included in the
analysis of underwriters compensation, and the NASD has the power to disapprove
of "unfair" compensation.
B. SRO Preemption of State Law1 70
Federal preemption of state law may occur under the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, and Congress has frequently preempted state law in the area of
financial regulation. Preemption may be express or implied. Preemption is express
when there is an explicit statutory command that state law be displaced.
171
Preemption is implied and state law is therefore displaced, "if federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the states to supplement it."172 This type of implied
preemption is often referred to as field preemption. State law may be displaced
under an implied conflict analysis if either it is impossible to comply with both a
state and a federal law, or if the state law "stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 173
169 See generally Mark A. Sargent, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings,
41 Bus. LAW. 785 (1986).
170 A more comprehensive treatment of this topic by the author is contained in
Roberta S. Karmel, Reconciling Federal and State Interests in Securities Regulation in the United
States and Europe, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495,497-524 (2003).
171 See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374, 383 (1992). A clear example of
express preemption in financial regulation is in the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 ("ERISA") which states that the provisions of that act "shall supersede any and all
state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144(a).
172 Cipollone v. Ligget Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Fidelity Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)). See also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463
U.S. 85, 96-99 (1983) (finding that state laws having a connection with or reference to
employee benefit plans are preempted by ERISA, with which Congress intended to preempt
an entire field); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator, 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); Patenaude v. Equitable Life
Ins., 290 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[A] statute may so completely preempt state law that
it occupies the entire field, barring assertion of any state law claims and permitting removal to
federal court.").
173 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz,
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance
An example of conflict preemption in securities law is Edgar v. MITE Corp., where an
Illinois takeover statute was found to conflict with the Exchange Act.174 In all cases
involving preemption, the courts look to the intent of Congress.175
When the federal securities laws were initially passed, Congress did not
explicitly preempt state law. To the contrary, Congress inserted "savings clauses" in
both the Securities Act of 1933 ("Securities Act") 176 and the Exchange Act.177 In view
of these savings clauses, the
Supreme Court found that state blue sky laws regulating the substantive
merits of securities offerings remained valid after the Securities Act and the
Exchange Act were passed,17 8 but the securities industry chafed at having to comply
with federal and state regulation, and advocated preemption of state blue sky laws
concerning offerings and the regulation of brokers and dealers. Initially, complaints
concerning duplication and inconsistency of unnecessary regulatory burdens were
answered by a 1980 statute179 adding (former) Section 19(c)(1) to the Securities Act
authorizing the SEC to cooperate with state government representatives in securities
matters to achieve effective, uniform securities regulations with a minimum
interference with the business of capital formation.18 0 Although the SEC then worked
with the North American Securities Administrators Association ("NASAA") and the
NASD to develop a state law uniform limited offering exemption and a uniform
174 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
175 Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992).
176 Former Section 18 of the Securities Act provided: "Nothing in this Subchapter
shall affect the jurisdiction of the securities commission (or any agency or office performing
like functions) of any State or Territory of the United States, or the District of Columbia, over
any security or any person." Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, § 18, 48 Stat. 74, 85 (current version
at 15 U.S.C. § 77r).
177 Former Section 28(a) of the Exchange Act was similar to former Section 18 of the
Securities Act. It provided: "Nothing in this chapter shall affect the jurisdiction of the
securities commission (or any agency or officer performing like functions) of any State over
any security or any person insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder."15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (1982).
178 See Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 557 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock
Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 567-68 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568, 572 (1917).
179 Omnibus Small Business Capital Formation Act of 1980, § 505, Pub. L. No. 96-477,
94 Stat. 2275, 2292-93 (adding Section 19(c) of the Securities Act).
180 15 U.S.C. § 77s(c)(1), (2) (now 77s(d)) (2002). The statute mandated an annual
conference of SEC and state regulators for the purpose of developing uniform securities forms
and procedures and a small issues exemption from registration. Further, the act provided that
"[nlothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing preemption of State law." Id. § 77s(d)
(3)-(4).
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system of registration for securities salesmen,181 there was considerable securities
industry dissatisfaction with the slow and essentially voluntary progress of the SEC
and NASAA in achieving uniform regulations pursuant to Section 19(c). 182
Much more sweeping deregulation of the state blue sky laws through
preemption was accomplished in the late 1990s, first by the National Securities
Markets Improvements Act of 1996 ("NSMIA")183 and then by the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 ("SLUSA"). 184 NSMIA preempted state
securities law in two areas of relevance to this article. First, it preempted blue sky
securities registration, merit review and prospectus disclosure requirements for
stock exchange and Nasdaq listed securities. It also preempted blue sky law in most
private placements. 185 Prior to NSMIA blue sky laws all contained a requirement for
registration of securities, but most state laws had an exemption from their
registration requirements for issuers listed on a national securities exchange.186 The
NASD had lobbied for Nasdaq listed securities to be similarly exempt, but NASAA
wished greater control over the criteria for a blue chip exemption3 87 NSMIA
essentially mandated a blue chip exemption for all nationally traded securities. This
preemption did not completely eliminate merit standards because of the NASD
regulation of underwriting terms and conditions with respect to offerings
underwritten by broker-dealers.188 This SRO regulation is a uniform national
standard, whereas state blue sky regulations were quite varied.
181 See Securities Uniformity: Annual Conference on Uniformity of Securities Law,
Securities Act Release No. 33-7050, 56 SEC Docket 764 (1994), available at 1994 WL 95225.
182 See State Regulators Adopt Model Commodity Code, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA)
619, 622 (Apr. 12, 1985); Hugh H. Makens et al., Blue Sky Practice Part I: Doing it Right: Avoiding
Liability Arising from State Private Offerings under ULOE and Limited Offering Exemptions, in
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE-AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REGULATION D OFFERINGS AND PRIVATE
PLACEMENTS 271, 280 (2001); David F.E. Banks, Hawaii Response to Regulation D, 23 HAWAII B. J.
1, 3 (1991)); Mark A. Sargent & Hugh H. Makens, ULOE: New Hope, New Challenge, 45 Bus.
LAW. 1319, 1319-20 (1990).
183 Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.)
184 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.105-353, 112, Stat.
3227 (1998).
185 15 U.S.C. §77r (1996). See, e.g., Pinnacle Commc'ns Int'l Inc. v. Am. Family
Mortgage Corp., 417 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (Minn. 2006).
186 See Mark A. Sargent, State Disclosure Regulation and the Allocation of Regulatory
Responsibilities, 46 MD. L. REV.1027, 1032 (1987).
187 See NASAA Agrees to Propose Amendments to '56 Uniform Acts at Spring Meeting, 18
SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA), Mar. 21, 1986, at 399.
188 NASD Rule 2710, SEC Release No. 34-30587 (Apr. 15, 1992).
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Second, NSMIA preempted state regulation of broker-dealers with respect to
capital, custody, margin, financial responsibility, records, bonding and reporting
requirements to the extent inconsistent with federal law.189 In addition, NSMIA
provided as follows:
No law, rule, regulation, or order, or other administrative action of
any State or political subdivision thereof shall establish capital,
custody, margin, financial responsibility, making and keeping
records, bonding, or financial or operational reporting requirements
for brokers, dealers, municipal securities dealers, government
securities brokers, or government securities dealers that differ from,
or are in addition to, the requirements in those areas established
under this chapter.190
The preemption of state regulation of SEC regulated broker-dealers and
investment advisers and their associated persons was not complete. The States
retained authority to investigate and bring enforcement actions for fraud, deceit, or
other unlawful conduct by a broker-dealer or investment adviser or their associated
persons.
The congressional justification for the preemption provisions of NSMIA was
that the system of dual federal and state securities regulation had resulted in
duplicative and unnecessary regulation. Further, this dual system was redundant,
costly and ineffective.191 Therefore regulatory responsibility was allocated based on
the nature of the securities offering. 192 Inherently national offerings were made
subject only to federal regulation, and the regulation of broker-dealer members of
the NASD and NYSE was also preempted. 193
189 National Securities Markets Improvements Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, §
103(a), 110 Stat. 3420 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §78o(h)(1) (2006)). Although the
SEC regulates all of these areas, further regulation is imposed and enforced by SROs. The SEC
was also given exclusive regulatory authority over investment advisers to SEC registered
investment companies and advisers with $25 million or more in assets under management.
190 Id.
191 H.R. CONF. REP. 104-864, at 39 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3920.
192 Id. at 40.
193 Id. at 39. See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Federalism and Investor Protection:
Constitutional Restraints on Preemption of State Remedies for Securities Fraud, 60 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 169, 170 (1997).
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SLUSA was even more deregulatory and its way of effecting preemption
was more radical. SLUSA provides that no class action based on state law alleging
fraud in connection with the purchase or sale of a "covered security" (essentially an
exchange listed security) may be maintained in state or federal court and any such
action shall be removable to a federal district court and dismissed. 94 Although the
Congress that passed SLUSA was generally comiitted to federalism, it found that
promoting efficient national securities markets was more convincing and compelling
than reinforcing state rights.195 State securities fraud cases not instituted as class
actions were not preempted. 196
Until the preemption of state blue sky law by NSMIA and SLUSA, it was
generally accepted that there was neither field nor conflict preemption of state
securities anti-fraud laws because SEC disclosure laws and regulations and state
disclosure or fiduciary laws complimented one another. Where a state court action is
instituted as a broad statutory or common law antifraud claim, it is difficult to find
preemption unless the SEC has acted by adopting detailed regulations. In Zuri-Invest
AG v. NatWest Finance, Inc., a federal district court held that a state fraud action was
not preempted by the federal securities laws, including NSMIA. 197 Rather, the
primary purpose of NSMIA was to preempt state blue sky laws regulating the
registration and underwriting of securities. It did not preclude states from regulating
fraudulent conduct or extinguish state claims based on fraud.1 98 Similar issues have
arisen under SLUSA. 9 On the other hand, if the SEC reviews a practice that could be
construed as fraudulent, but determines either it should be permitted to continue or
it should merely be disclosed to investors, can state law which would outlaw such a
194 Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, §101, 112
Stat. 3227 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(b)-(c) (2000)).
195 See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 4 (1998).
196 See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private State Securities Fraud
Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REV. 273, 287 (1998).
197 177 F. Supp. 2d 189, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); accord, IDS Bond Fund, Inc. v. Gleacher
NatWest Corp., No. CIV. 99-116 (MJDJGL), 2002 WL 373455, at *7 (D. Minn. March 6, 2002);
Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc., 122 F.Supp.2d 407, 431-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2000);
Gabriel Capital, L.P. v. NatWest Finance, Inc., 94 F.Supp.2d 491, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). But see
Myers v. Merrill Lynch, 1999 WL 696082, at *8-10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 1999), affd 249 F.3d 1087
(9th Cir. 2001).
198 See also H.R. REP No. 104-622, as reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3877, 3899
("Committee's intention not to alter .... State statutory or common law with respect to fraud
or deceit").
199 See Green v. Ameritrade, Inc., 279 F.3d 590, 597 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that state
contract claims are not preempted by SLUSA).
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practice, or impose liability for its continuation, be allowed to coexist with federal
law? This issue was raised in state law cases challenging payment for order flow and
most of the courts which addressed the issue found implied or field preemption.
Payment for order flow is the remuneration in the form of monetary or other
benefits given to retail securities broker-dealers for routing customers' orders for
execution to particular wholesale dealers, market makers or exchanges. 200 The
growth and pervasiveness of payment for order flow practices in the 1980s and 1990s
aroused extensive debate over its merits and harms. In response, the SEC conducted
a comprehensive study of order flow payments. The SEC concluded that the practice
produces certain economic benefits to customers.20 1 The SEC also recognized
opposing concerns as to the possible conflict of interest and breach of duty of best
order execution. 20 2
In an attempt to address the issue with particularity, the SEC amended Rule
10b-10, which governs confirmation disclosure to broker-dealer customers, in 1994.203
Amended Rule 10b-10 requires a broker-dealer to disclose in each transaction
confirmation slip whether payment for order flow was received, and that the source
and nature of the payment would be available at the customer's request.2 4 In
addition, the SEC adopted a new rule, llAcl-3, which required annual disclosure to
customers of a broker's or dealer's policies regarding receipt of payments for order
flow, the market makers to which customer orders are routed, and the aggregate
amount of payments received for order flow in the previous year.205
200 Exchange Act Release No. 34-34902, 59 Fed. Reg. 55006, 55008 (Nov. 2, 1994).
201 These were: lower unit costs; increased retail brokerage firm revenues; lowered
commissions; more expeditious executions; enhanced customer services; increased
competition from automated execution systems and related practices; increased competition
between wholesale dealers and exchanges and vertically integrated firms; and reduced
execution costs in all markets, including the exchanges. Payment for Order Flow, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-33026, at 24-26, 58 Fed. Reg. 52934, 52939-40 (Oct. 13, 1993).
202 59 Fed. Reg. 55006, 55008.
203 See 59 Fed. Reg. 55006. The amended Rule 10b-10, which became effective in
October 1995, defined order flow payments as "all forms or arrangements compensating for
directing order flow." Id. at 55008.
204 Id. at 55010. The SEC rejected as too burdensome and unworkable proposals that
order flow payments be passed through to the customers, id. at 55010-11, n.42, as well as its
own initial proposal that brokers disclose the amount of payments for order flow. Id. at 55010,
n.39.
205 17 C.F.R. § 240.11Acl-3 (1995) (repealed 2005).
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Subsequently, payment for order flow was tested in a number of state courts
in cases claiming breach of fiduciary duty. The highest courts of New York, 20 6
Minnesota, 207 Illinois, 208 and Pennsylvania, 209 as well as two other states' intermediate
appellate courts, 210 found that the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act and SEC
disclosure regulations implicitly preempted state common law regarding any breach
of fiduciary duty involved in payment for order flow practices. The prevailing view
of the state courts that considered cases alleging that payment for order flow was a
breach of fiduciary duty was that federal law and regulations implicitly preempted
state law. Except for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, which found field
preemption, all other courts found implicit conflict preemption, in that permitting
state common law cases to go forward would be an obstacle to the national market
system provisions of the Exchange Act. The interesting question for this article is
this: what if Rules 10b-10 and 1lAcl-3 had been NASD, rather than SEC rules? Now
that FINRA has a single rule book applicable to all SEC registered broker-dealers,
delegation by the SEC to FINRA to establish this type of controversial, complicated
rule-making, where broad industry input is important for future compliance, seems
likely. Would courts similarly find implied conflict preemption by reason of an SRO
rule?
A few cases involving the California Standards relating to arbitrator
qualifications would suggest an affirmative answer to this question. Because these
standards went beyond the NASD's arbitrator qualification standards, the NASD
adopted a rule requiring parties to an arbitration to waive the California Standards.
In a series of cases, the California Superior Court 211 and the Ninth Circuit212 held that
the NASD rules regarding arbitrator qualifications pre-empted the California
Standards, which had been promulgated by the California Judicial Council. The
reason for such preemption was that the NASD and NYSE had "operated their own
206 Guice v. Charles Schwab & Co., 674 N.E.2d 282, 290 (N.Y. 1996).
207 Dahl v. Charles Schwab & Co., 545 N.W.2d 918, 925 (Minn. 1996).
208 Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 688 N.E.2d 620, 626 (Ill. 1997).
209 Shulick v. PaineWebber & Co., 722 A.2d 148, 151 (Pa. 1998).
210 Eirman v. Olde Disc. Corp., 697 So.2d 865, 866 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); Mickey v.
Charles Schwab, 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 213, 219 (Ca. App. 1998). But see Thomas v. Charles Schwab,
Civ.A. No. 95-0307, 1995 WL 626522, at *2 (W.D. La. July 12, 1995) (finding neither express
preemption nor implied congressional preemptive intent).
211 See Jevne v. Superior Court, 111 P.3d 954 (Cal. 2005).
212 Credit Suisse First Boston Corp. v. Grunwald, 400 F.3d 1119, 1136 (9th Cir. 2005);
NASD Dispute Resolution, Inc. v. Judicial Council, 488 F.3d 1065, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005).
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securities arbitration services for decades under federal auspices" and their
standards and procedures were "not entirely consistent with the California
standards." 213 Since the SEC had approved these SRO standards, preemption had
occurred by delegated authority. 214
C. Conflict With Antitrust Laws
Where regulatory statutes are silent with regard to antitrust, courts are
required to determine whether, and in what respects there has been an implicit
repeal of the antitrust laws.215 Implied repealers of the antitrust laws "are strongly
disfavored, and have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between the
antitrust and regulatory provisions." 216 Conflicts between the antitrust laws and the
securities laws involving SRO regulation have been common, because the initial
foundation for SRO regulation was fixed minimum commissions for NYSE members
and preferential price dealing for NASD members. In Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange,217 a nonmember broker sued the NYSE under the Sherman Act after the
NYSE ordered the discontinuance of his wire connections with the offices of NYSE
members without notice, explanation or a hearing. In this case, a test for reconciling
antitrust laws with securities regulation was set forth as follows: "Repeal [of the
antitrust laws] is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the Securities
Exchange Act work, and even then only to the minimum extent necessary." 218 The
Court held that no policy of the Exchange Act was served by this conduct and
therefore the NYSE had acted in violation of the Sherman Act.
Over a decade later the Supreme Court broadened the area in which the
antitrust laws may be impliedly repealed by the securities laws. In Gordon v. New
York Stock Exchange, Inc.,219 the Court held that the antitrust laws did not apply to the
system of fixed commission rates then utilized by the stock exchanges because the
SEC had the authority to do away with fixed commissions if it found them
213 Id. at 1067.
214 Credit Suisse First Boston, 400 F.3d at 1128. In another case, involving compulsory
NYSE arbitration between a registered representative and a member firms and associated
persons, the Second Circuit held that such compulsory arbitration was within the purposes of
the Exchange Act, as amended in 1975. Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 355 (2d Cir. 1978).
215 Credit Suisse Sec. (USA), LLC v. Billing, 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2385 (2007).
216 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 351 (1963).
217 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
218 Id. at 357.
219 422 U.S. 659, 685 (1975).
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inconsistent with the regulatory structure. Direct and active supervision by the SEC
over rate-fixing by securities exchanges negated the possibility of antitrust liability
for fixed commissions. In a second case of the same year, the Court found that the
SEC had not exercised the same degree of supervision with regard to the secondary
trading of mutual funds, but read the applicable legislative history as granting the
SEC the informed administrative judgment to do so.220
The 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, passed in the same year as these
cases, made clear that the SEC's role in passing on exchange or other SRO rules must
include an evaluation of the anti-competitive aspect of such rules. Within one year
after the effective date of the statute, the SEC was required to determine whether the
rules of any national securities exchange or registered securities association
complied with the Exchange Act. Thereafter, proposed rule changes of exchanges
and associations were subjected to prior rule-making procedures by the SEC and
could not take effect without an SEC finding that such rule was consistent with the
Exchange Act. These provisions required the SEC to take competition into
consideration in reviewing all existing and any new exchange or association rules.221
A more recent antitrust case addressed questionable joint action by
underwriters. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) v. Billing'2 was a class action against a
number of investment banks, acting as underwriters, alleging various illegal
practices: (1) laddering, or buying shares of an IPO at escalating prices; (2) paying
unusually high commissions on other securities; and (3) tying or purchasing less
desirable securities. The Second Circuit essentially held that since these practices
were alleged to be illegal under both the securities laws and the antitrust laws, the
antitrust case could proceed. 223 The Supreme Court framed the issue differently as
whether there was a plain repugnancy between the antitrust claims and the federal
securities laws, and concluded that there was. Referring to Gordon and NASD, Court
set forth a number of factors showing sufficient incompatibility to warrant an
implication of antitrust repeal: (1) regulatory authority under the securities laws to
supervise the activities in question; (2) evidence that the SEC has exercised such
authority; and (3) a risk of conflicting guidance under both the antitrust and
220 United States v. Nat'l Ass'n of Secs. Dealers, Inc. 422 U.S. 694, 728 (1975).
221 See Exchange Act § 6(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(b)(8); Exchange Act § 11A(1)(C)(ii), 15
U.S.C. 78k-l(a)(1)(C)(ii); Exchange Act § 15A(b)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3(b)(9).
222 127 S. Ct. 2383 (2007).
223 426 F.3d 130 (2005), rev'd, 127 S.Ct. 2383 (2007).
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securities laws.224 In the Court's view, since the activities under attack were in an
area important to the functioning of the capital markets, only an expert body like the
SEC could properly determine whether the activities were legal or illegal, since all
underwriting syndicates involve joint action. Therefore the courts should be
precluded from judging these activities under the antitrust laws.
In the antitrust cases discussed above, the rules which permitted the conduct
under attack were all SRO, not SEC, rules, although the SEC had authority to
approve, disapprove or amend these rules. It was therefore SROs, not the SEC, that
were making the determination in the first instance to condone conduct that could be
a violation of the antitrust laws. Yet, none of the cases focused on the fact that an
SRO rule was displacing the antitrust laws. Rather, the focus was on the SEC's
authority and the SEC's oversight of the conduct in question.225
VI. Conclusion
Although FINRA may not be a government entity, in all or virtually all of its
activities, it can be viewed as exercising powers delegated to it by the SEC. This is a
delegation from an agency which itself is exercising delegated powers, and therefore
is not directly accountable to the public. Accountability by FINRA to its members
has been undermined by the governance reforms imposed by the SEC. In the final
analysis, FINRA is accountable only to the SEC. Yet initially, the regulatory powers
of the NYSE were not governmental but rather a matter of private contract between
the NYSE and its members. Similarly, the origins of the NASD were in a trade
association. At what point did these powers become transmogrified into
governmental powers? This was a gradual development, probably finally
accomplished without much consideration by the 1975 Act Amendments to the
Exchange Act.
Although FINRA undoubtedly will deny that it is an agency subject to the
Constitutional and legislative constraints applicable to the SEC, in many areas it will
nevertheless "voluntarily" adopt equivalent procedures. Two important questions
are raised by this construct: First, should further compliance be compelled; and
second, what is the real difference between FINRA and a government agency? One
difference is its corporate governance. FINRA's directors are not appointed by the
SEC and a substantial number, although not a majority, come from the securities
224 127 S. Ct. 2383, 2394.
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industry. Another difference is its funding, which comes from membership fees. But
as the SEC exercises ever increasing oversight of FINRA are these differences
sufficient to keep FINRA a private sector body?
As organizations, SROs have several advantages over government agencies.
They can be more flexible in their hiring, pay higher salaries and develop cadres of
experts as their employees. They are financed by assessments on the securities
industry, rather than out of general tax revenues. They are not bound by the many
accountability mechanisms imposed upon government organizations, which may
make these organizations operate in a more open and democratic fashion, but also
can turn them into slow moving bureaucracies. Because SROs involve the securities
industry in their decision making, they are able to fashion regulations which often
are more realistic than government regulations, and effect voluntary compliance
with these regulations. Yet, the very freedom of action that SROs have may
sometimes give them the ability to ignore the constitutional and other rights of
persons subject to their rule-making or disciplinary actions. When SROs are
exercising governmental powers, they should be subject to constitutional constraints
in their dealings with securities industry personnel and the public. They should
similarly be bound by the fundamental due process protections contained in the
Administrative Procedure Act and similar statutes.
Nevertheless, to subject SROs to all of the constraints to which the SEC is
subject with regard to their operations would reduce their utility in the scheme of
securities regulation. If FINRA is going to be regulated like the SEC, it may as well
become part of the SEC. If the SEC becomes too controlling of FINRA's governance
and operations, FINRA will no longer be an SRO. While, criticism of SROs as being
insufficiently responsive to the public interest has been leveled over the years by
Congress, there is a danger that FINRA will be insufficiently responsive to the needs
and concerns of the securities industry, and will become merely an arm of the SEC.
Should this occur, the duplicative nature of SEC and SRO regulation of broker-
dealers will make such regulation inefficient and ineffective. FINRA should be given
the opportunity to operate as an independent, non-political expert body engaged in
the regulation of broker-dealers, without undue interference from the SEC or
Congress, but it will have to prove that it can be sensitive and responsive both to the
securities industry and the public interest.

